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INTRODUCTION
Technology is constantly changing with new processes
and products being introduced each year.

The need to

acquire technology is consistent, and countries must expand
their technologies as they expand their economies. 1

The

transfer of technology is important for two reasons.

First,

technology helps educate and promote international understanding.

Technology transfers help increase the mutual

respect for each other, and mutual respect is a more stable
basis for 'world peace than arms limitation treaties.
Second, the transfer of technologies enriches both nations
because both countries should become more prosperous.

As

countries become more prosperous, trade becomes more abundant and profitable for both countries. 2
Problems in technology transfers come about because the
products and techniques developed by the industrialized
nations are not always best suited for the country that is
importing it. 3

Importing countr~es, though, are under

strong economic and political pressure to purchase new technology.

Once the new technology is purchased they must

protect their domestic industries.

Importing countries hope

to create employment, save foreign exchange and utilize
native resources when they import new technology. 4

2

Countries that have imported large amounts of foreign
technology often adapt protectionist policies to protect
their industries and try to develop extensively.

Extensive

industrialization has often caused countries to spread thin
critical resources, such as technical and managerial skills
needed to run industries.

This often leads to problems of

absorb{ng the technology into the country's economy. 5
The countries that have been most successful with
technological development have been those that have sought
selective imports of foreign technology, while taking positive steps to protect native development.
countries to develop native
to foreign knowledge.

~echnology

This allows

and still have access

Countries need to build their own

infrastructure, develop technology plans, and provide incentives for native research and development. 6
The ability of a country to decide which technology it
wants to adapt and improve upon is important.

The new

techniques and products of technology are important in
development of native technology.

The accumulation of tech-

nology can be broken down into three stages:

first is the

ability to make independent technological decisions;
is the ability to make minor innovations;

second

and third is the

ability to create new technologies from previous technology.
Technology transfer is a complex relationship between the
import of technology and the development of new native
technology. 7

3

The importation of complete package deals tends to limit
the ability of the country buying the new technology to make
an independent choice.

This may cause native development of

technology to be inhibited by indiscriminate imports which
occur because of clauses in contracts which involve the
transfer of technology. 8

Native technological capacity is

of great importance and is a vital part in developing a
country's native technologies.

Countries must undertake

their own research and development projects as an alternative to continued reliance on foreign technology. 9
Countries should choose technologies which have a potential
for long-term comparative advantage.

Technologies should be

chosen which are conducive to native technological development and restricted when they are competitive. 10
Countries that have tried to industrialize quickly have
had problems with high resource costs and foreign exchange
problems.

Policies that have aimed at progressive autarky

have fostered a seller's market which tends to undermine
technical standards throughout the economy.

These policies

can lead to a widening of the technological gap between
nations. 11
Technology properly conceived and applied can contribute to the economic growth and development of a country.
The use of more efficient technology will help development
within the country.

The limits of technological progress is

set by the quality of human and natural resources, the stage

4

of industrial development, and the economic policy of the
country. 12
Technology, when adjusted to the technological level
and skills of a country, can be an important factor in its
overall industrialization plan.

Techno1ogical development

is more than just the tr an sf er of hardware, it is the
;-

nurturing of indigenous capabilities to operate industry and
to adapt and build upon technology in response to changing
needs.

A technological society must be able to develop the

ability to transfer technology within its own borders, as
well as be able to use imported technology. 13
The Soviet Union is one country which has imported
technology from foreign sources for many years.

Before the

Soviets came to power in 1917, Russia had been dependent on
the West for much of its new technology and there was substantial Western investment in Russia.

After the Bolsheviks

seized power in 1917, they expropriated all Western investments without compensation.

Three years after the revolu-

tion, Lenin invited Western firms to set up concessions in
the Soviet Union.

A total of 350 concessions were set up,

which had an extraordinary effect on the economy. 14
The First Five-Year Plan (1928-1933) relied heavily
upon Western technology and management.

Two-thirds of the

large industrial projects were built with American assistance.

In 1930,

the United States' exports alone reached an

all-time high of $230 million, but by 1932 exports had

5

fallen to less than $28 million.
had ceased to exist.

By 1933 all concessions

The reason for the drop in technology

was that the Soviet Union had attained a considerable degree
of industrial self sufficiency. 15
During the Second World War the Soviet Union received
another infusion of Western technology into its economic
,

system.

Under Lend-Lease,

the Soviet Union received $2.6

billion worth of non-military goods from the United States,
including $1.25 billion of the latest American industrial
equip~ent.

The Soviet Union also received $10 billion worth

of industrial and military equipment dismantled from Germany
and shipped back to the Soviet Union.

From the Soviet zone

they acquired several thousand plants, representing fortyone percent of Germany's 1943 capacity and still removed
another twenty-five percent from the Western Allied zone.
The Soviets also needed specialists to bring the industrial
capacity into operation and to develop it further, so
technicians were shipped to the Soviet Union. 16
The Soviet Union, in the late 1950s started to import
technology from the West.

After the death of Stalin the

Soviet leaders recognized that there was a large technological gap separating them from the developed countries.
The Seven-Year Plan started in 1958, was designed to
industrialize the Soviet Union by using technology from the
West. 17

6

The Nixon administration, in 1969, signed into law the
Export Administration Act, which replaced the Export Control
Act.

The Export Administration Act greatly liberalized

restrictions on the export of goods and technology to the
Soviet Union.

The law continued to ban the export of

technology that would "make a significant contribution to
the mi!itary potential" of the Soviet Union, but allowed
technology which would contribute to the Soviet Union's
"economic potential. 1118
The last two years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, 1979
and 1980, were unusually poor years for the Soviet economy.
The gross national product grew at an average rate of 1.2
percent per year. 19

The five-year growth target set in 1976

was 4.7 percent growth rate, but even this modest growth
rate was not met.

The Eleventh Five-Year Plan targets of

gross national product was set at 4.0 percent per year,
lower than the preceding five-year plan. 20

The Soviet

leaders are hoping that their economy will improve by improving the productivity of labor and capital.

In order to

achieve better labor productivity, better management and
more efficient technological innovations are needed. 21
The effects of technology transfers on the Soviet
economy depend upon the ability of the Soviet Union to
increase productivity from the new technology.

The danger

of technology transfer from the West to the Soviet Union is
not so much the possibility of a quick short-term jump in

7

military technology, but rather the long-term growth and
expansion of the civilian industries that will help create a
broad infrastructure for the new military system of
tomorrow. 22
Problem Statement
If the Soviets are using their newly imported technology to its fullest potential, then the Soviets should be
able to absorb the new technology into its economic system
and diffuse it beyond one or two showcase locations, and
they should be able to build upon the new technology to
create the next generation of technology rather than waiting
to import it from the West.
General Problem
The effect of technology transfer on the Soviet Union's
economy depends on how it absorbs and diffuses it into its
economy.

The danger for the West in transferring technology

to the Soviet Union is not from short-term military advances
that might come about, but from long-term growth and
expansion of its civilian industries.

The growth and expan-

sion of the civilian industries could help build an infrastructure on which to build its military power in the
future.

The Soviet leaders are trying to improve their

civilian industries by increasing their productivity of
labor capital.

To increase the productivity of labor and

8

capital they have turned to the West for the needed technological

innovation.
Methodology

It is the intent of this study to compare case studies
on the Soviet chemical and petroleum industries.

These

studies should show whether or not the high priority status
I"

these industries have to import Western technology has
allowed them to build upon the technology and create their
own new technology.

The studies should also show if time is

an important factor in the Soviet Union becoming a more
innovative nation, since the chemical industry has been
importing Western technology in large amounts since 1958,
and the petroleum industry started to import large amounts
in 1973.
Terminology
The word technology can cause some confusion depending
on whom you are discussing it with.

Businessmen, politi-

cians, military specialists and economists have their own
literature on the subject and approach it differently
depending on their professional biases.

For this paper

technology is a set of skills, procedures and technical
information that amount to a capability to produce a certain
product or to employ a certain process in production. 23
Technology transfer is the acquisition of needed information
from one country by another.

It includes materials and

9

equipment which are not available in the receiving country,
minor but consequential design features that need to be
known, and manufacturing and organizational skills that are
not available in the receiving country. 24
Technological change is likely to take place in
"embodied" (in new equipment) form rather than "disembodied"
(implemented with pre-existing capital goods).

Technologi-

cal changes are not free goods, there is a cost to implement
them.

Technical change, though, enhances the productivity

of resources making finished goods more cost effective.

In

today's world there is normally only one innovator of a
given product or process.

The spread of the innovation to

other business units or production units is generally
ref erred to as "diffusion. n 25
There are important distinctions between different
types of technology transfers.
fer,

There a.re "material" trans-

"design" transfer and "capacity" tr an sf er.

"Material"

transfer is when a country that does not produce a · product
decides to increase productivity by importing the needed
product.

"Design" transfer is when a country increases

productivity by importing a plant to make the product.
"Capacity" transfer is when the country goes beyond importing a plant but also gains the capability to replicate such
a plant from domestic resources.

The development of a

capability to independently modify and improve the plant
design is the next step, but this would be done by

10

indigenous resources.

It is generally believed that in the

case of the Soviet Union, design and capacity transfers are
of predominant importance. 26
International technology transfer is any process
whereby the productivity of resources of one country can be
increased by the transmission from other countries of knowledge, whether it be embodied or disembodied.
tran£fer can

Technology

be deliberately arranged by the supplier, or

transfer not arranged by the supplier.

Technology transfers

are identified by their potential to raise the productivity
of resources, not by their actually increasing it. 27
There are many ways that the transfer of technology can
take place.

Technology can be transferred by traveling

scientists and technologists who communicate with others
from other countries about technological information; by
reading foreign technical literature; the purchase of
foreign licenses, know-how and training; industrial espionage; the purchase of individual foreign products to be
reverse-engineered; the purchase of foreign goods for direct
use; cooperation with foreign firms or other organizations
in research and development and production. 28
Some of these channels of . transfer require the active
participation of the foreign supplier of the technology,
while other channels do not require the organization or firm
which has the information to know that the transfer is
taking place.

Governments, in some cases, exercise

11

considerable control over the supplier of certain technologies and in other cases the control of technology is
almost impossible.

Technology is also transferred

"embodied" in products while others are disembodied.

A

large part of the technologies that are transferred from
Western governments to the Soviet Union are commercial
transfers which are to some extent controlled by Western
governments. 29
Commercial transfers include the following: capitalgoods and know-how purchases or other bilaterally agreed
supplies on a large scale; direct foreign investment and
cooperation in science and technology that is greater than
an occasional visit by scientists.

Commercial transfers

require a fair deal of persona1 contact, long visits by
scientists and sustained cooperation between citizens of
both countries. 30
Technology comes mostly from a few highly industrialized countries.

Technology which is transferred is

usually proven technology, technology that has been accepted
by industrial executives and other technologists.

The

transfer of unproven, uncommercialized technology is likely
to be risky and relatively costly.

The cost of technology

can also be influenced by whether or not the transferrer had
previous experience of starting-up manufacture with the new
technology.

Countries that seek new technology do not

usually buy "the latest in technology" but rather buy

12
technology which has been proven.
nology

ar~

The buyers of new tech-

usually aware of the problems of buying unproven

technology and therefore insist on performance guarantees
that it be proven.

In an area where technology changes

quickly the transferrer is likely to be selling proven
technology while developing the next generation of technology in the field.

The transferrer usually tends to maintain

some~leadtime a~vantage over those to whom they sell. 31
The Soviet Union buys technology in basically two
forms,

"know-how" or "do-how."

They buy the right to use a

particular patented process to improve their efficiency or
to extend the range of output.

In doing this they are

buying the "know-how" in the form of drawings, layouts,
machinery lists, process details, and control information.
The Soviet Union also buys complete plants which is both the
"do-how" and the "know-how."

The Soviet Union buys the

authority to use a process with all the technical detail,
along with a staff trained in the art of the process who
train Soviet workers and are responsible for the startup of
the plant, and sometimes there are clauses which require the
updating of plants with newer technology. 32

ENDNOTES
1 Frances Stewart, International Technology Transfer:
Issues and Policy Options (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,
[1979])' p. i.
2 James R. Basche, Jr. and Michael G. Duerr,
International Transfer of Technology: A World Survey of
Chie~ Executives (New York: The Conference Board, Inc.,
[1975])' p. 1.
3 Ibid., p. 3.
4 Jack Baranson, Industrial Technologies for
Developing Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1969)' p. 6.

Inc.,

5 Ibid.
6 stewart, International Technology Transfer,
pp. v-vi.
7 Ibid., p. v.
8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p. ix.
10 Basche and Duerr, International Transfer of
Technology, p.1.
11 Baranson, Industrial Technologies for Developing
Countries, p. 6.
1 2 Ibid., p. 112
13 Ibid., p. 115.
14 carl Gershwin, "Selling Them the Rope: Business and
the Soviets," Commentary 64 (April 1979) : 36.
15 Ibid., p. 37.
13

14
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18

~hane Gustaf son, Selling the Russians the Rope?

Soviet Technology Policy and U.S. Export Controls,
· corporation R2649-ARPA April 1981), p. 5.
19 rbid.

I

p. 1.

20 rbid.

I

p. 3.

(The Rand

21 rbid., p. 8.
,..

22 rbid.

I

p. vi.

23 Philip Hanson, Trade and Technology in SovietWestern Relations (New York: Columbia University Press,
1981), p.7.
24 Ibid.
25 rbid., p. 12.
26 Ibid., p. 13.
27 rbid.

I

p. 14e

28 Ibid.
29 rbid., pp. 14-15.
30 rbid.
31 rbid.

I

pp. 19-20.

32 v. Sobeslavsky and P. Beazley, The Transfer of
Technology to Socialist Countries (Cambridge:
Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1980), p. 60.

CASE STUDY OF THE SOVIET CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
The Soviet chemical industry is important to the Soviet
economy.

The chemical industry was one of the first

industries to receive high priority status after the death
of Stalin.

The "chemicalization" drive was started by

Khruschev and remains as one of the few programs he started.
The need for access to Western technology to complete the
chemicalization drive led to the Soviet policy of "peaceful
co-existance." 1
History of Soviet Chemical Industry
The modern chemical industry began in the late eighteenth century and developed rapidly in the nineteenth century throughout Europe, especially Britain and Germany.

The

Russian chemical industry lagged behind the developed
European countries and was still in its infancy when the
First World War broke out.

There were several notable

developments that occurred during the nineteenth century in
Russia.

Russia was the first country to have a large-scale

industrial plant to manufacture · sulphuric acid based on the
catalytic contact process and the production of soda by the
Solvay process, but these were exceptions. 2

15

16

Prior to the First World War large segments of the
Russian chemical industry were owned and managed by foreign
businessmen.

This caused a number of negative features

which inhibited indigenous development.

The chemical

engineering industry in Russia was extremely weak and most
of its machines were imported from more developed
countries. 3
rAfter the 1917 revolution the Soviet Union embarked on
the road of creating a new economic and social order which
was an antithesis of Western capitalism.

The Soviet readi-

ness to accept Western technology was an exception to its
tendency towards closeness and hostility in respect to the
West. 4

The rejection of the free market, the essence of

capitalism, was not only rejected by the founders of socialism in the Soviet Union but was suppressed by the application of strict central control over economic activity.

The

marketplace, though, has been one of mankind's most ancient
institutions and the success of the Soviet Union to eliminate it for good has been limited.

The role of the market-

element in their economy's functioning has increased and
decreased over the years. 5
From 1917 to 1921 the Soviet economy was totally nationalized and run on strict principles of centralism and tight
control over the limited resources and productive capacity
that still operated.

After the revolution and civil war,

Lenin realized that the peacetime task was to restore the

17
Soviet Union to its pre-war levels of production and that
this could not be accomplished by tight controls.

In 1921,

the Soviet Union changed from the strict controlled economy
to a semi-market based economy which was known as the New
Economic Policy (NEP).

NEP was a partial de-nationalization

of the means of production; large industry, banking- and
foreign trade remained under the central government but
r

small traders and manufacturers were given a freer hand in
conducting their affairs.

Peasants were allowed to produce

for the market, industrial managers, civil servants, and
other professionals returned to their jobs.

Foreign capital

was allowed into the country in the form of concessions
given mainly by industries extracting and processing raw
materials.

NEP showed that the Soviet leaders . and their

system were capable of pragmatism and flexibility on the one
hand and extreme inflexibility on the other. 6
The chemical industry rebounded during NEP in the
1920s.

Under Glavkhim, the department for the development

of the chemical industry, the chemical industry began to be
restored to its pre-war levels.

Much of the restoration

came from Europe in the form of concessions and technical
agreements that were arranged between the new Soviet government and foreign firms.

By the late 1920s restoration of

the chemical industry had been completed to the pre-war
levels. 7

18
Stalin, in 1928-29, embarked upon a course of breakneck
industrialization and collectivization, at a speed never
exceeded before.

The economic system responded from the

- revolution from above which can be regarded as the
restoration of the principles of strict central government
planning at the expense of a free-market economy.

The

market was squeezed out. 8
During the period of forced industrialization that
succeeded NEP,
rapidly.

the chemical industry's base developed

The Soviet Union tried to catch up with the

leading Western countries by creating and expanding basic
branches of the Soviet chemical industry.

The Soviet Union

rapidly enlarged its capacity for the production of basic
inorganic and organic chemical, chemical fertilizers and
some synthetic materials. 9
The Soviet Union acquired Western technology by various
means, during NEP and through Stalin's rule.

Complete

plants and machines were imported along with Western engineers who supervised and trained Soviet workers and enginee rs.

The Soviet Union also acquired technology through

reverse engineering by dismantling a prototype bought in the
West and seeing how it worked. 1 ~
Since the 1930s the Soviet Union has been successful in
laying the basic foundation for its chemical industry, and
the · chemical industry has grown at a rapid pace.

The Soviet

Union's chemical industry has grown rapidly but there

19
still exists a wide gulf between the Soviet Union and the
United States.11
After the death of Stalin in the 1950s the Soviet
leaders became more aware of the technology gap.

The Soviet

Union responded to this gap by initiating an impressive
program of rapid modernization of their economy. In 1958,
the plan to instigate a chemical modernization plan started.
"Chem"icalization," as the plan came to be known, was heavily
dependent upon Western imports, and/or the manufacturing
licenses because the research was intensive.

Soviet lack of

research and development expertise in the area was especially pronounced.

This was in part due to the excessive

reliance upon coal by the Soviet Union over the preceding
years. 12
The Soviet chemical industry developed quickly after
Khruschev, in 1958, started a major industrial campaign to
modernize the industry.

This drive was in keeping with the

nature of the Soviet system.

The "chemicalization" drive

remains one of the few programs today that was started by
Khruschev.

Khruschev recognized that the future of the

chemicalization drive depended upon freer access to the
fruits of technological progress.
policy of "peaceful co-existence."

Out of this grew the
"Chemicalization"

implied a rapid expansion of output of a whole range of
synthetic materials previously not made in the Soviet Union.
These synthetic materials were to replace, where possible,

20

the traditional materials.

In agriculture, chemical fer-

tilizers were intended to play a major role in efforts to
increase the yield of crop lands and ultimately meat and
dairy products. 1 3
The creation of a synthetic material industry required
the Soviet Union to switch its feedstock from coal to oil
and natural gas because a modern chemical industry is based
on the petrochemical industry.

The "chemicalization" pro-

gram has required a tremendous injection of capital.
"Chemicalization" constitutes one of the most important
pillars in the strategy of intensive economic growth.

It

implies an expansion throughout the economy of the use of
new materials which are research and development intensive,
but when used in industry, agriculture, and construction,
b~ing

about vast savings when they replace expensive tradi-

tional materials and the labor hours involved in handling
the traditional materials. 14
Over the past twenty plus years of "chemicalization,"
the Soviet Union has continued to import technology and has
commercial relations with Western multinationals.

These

relations have increased in scope and have become more
varied. 15

In the early 1970s the transfer of Western

technology to the Soviet Union became a public issue.

The

transfer of Western technology to the Soviet Union had been
occurring since the Russian Revolution in 1917, but it did
not become a public issue because the amount of it was so

21
small.

The first major deal to draw attention was the Fiat

Tolyatti deal.

This contract called for the construction of

a huge car-making complex in the USSR incorporating Fiat
technology.

The second deal involved Ford and the USSR.

The Kama River

truck~making

complex (known as KamAZ)

involved massive amounts of Western machinery and know-how.
The third factor for increased trade between the West and
the Soviet Union grew out of trade agreements signed between
the Soviet government and the Nixon administration in 1972.
These three agreements in retrospect have been especially
effective in focusing public attention on West-East technology transfers.1 6
In the 1970s a wide range of views were expressed
about the impact of West-East technology transfer.

Was the

West allowing the Soviet Union to benefit from the transfer
of advanced technology?

Was the Soviet Union becoming more

dependent on the West for the import of Western machinery
and know-how?

How great were the gains that the Soviet

Union made from importing advanced technology from the
West? 17
The major constraint on imports to the Soviet Union
since 1955 is the limitation created by the Soviet's lack of
hard-currency.

As a result of this limitation the flow of

imports to the Soviet Union has remained small in relation
to other imputs of Soviet production.

Both embodied tech-

nology and technology in the form of licenses and know-how

22

have remained small. 18

East-West commercial relations

throughout the years have always been conducted in an
atmosphere of caution and hostility as well as enthusiasm
and often unjustified optimism about the reduction of
tension and an increase in business trade. 19
Inorganic and Organic Branches of the Soviet
Chemical Industry
The chemical industry of the Soviet Union can be broken
down into two branches: inorganic chemicals, based on acids
and alkali; and organic chemicals, which is based on
petroleum as the feedstock for synthetic materials.

The

transfer of Western technology to these two branches of the
chemical branch will be discussed below.
Inorganic Chemical Industry
The Soviet inorganic chemical industry has performed
relatively well in terms of total output.

This industry

represents the more traditional and well-established branch
of the chemical industry.

The processes it uses as well as

the products it turns out have been known for a relatively
long time.

The inorganic chemical industry is made up of

two groups of chemicals, acids and alkali products.

The

acids include sulphuric, nitric, hydrochloric acid and
ammonia.

The alkali products include soda ash, caustic soda

and chlorine.

These products have enormous applications in

all branches of the chemical industry.

The Soviets have

23

successfully scaled up inorganic chemical technology and
therefore its dependence on imported equipment has been
minima1. 20
The Soviet

~nion's

inorganic chemical industry has

performed best when compared with Western countries.

The

volume of soda ash (Na 2 co 3 ), a key alkali, produced in the
Soviet Union is close to the amount produced by the United
States .
occurs.

. when we look at per capita, a different picture
In per capita terms the Soviet Union is still

behind the United States along with West Germany and France.
The Soviet Union is also one of the largest producers of
sulphuric acid, but in per capita terms it still is behind
many Western European countries and the United States. 21
In studying the fertilizer production, an area that has
received considerable priority in the Soviet Union, we find
that the Soviet Union possesses an extremely rich material
base.

Fertilizers are seen as being one of the ways to help

improve Soviet agriculture.

The Soviet Union can draw upon

its large natural gas reserves to create nitrogenous fertilizers and upon large deposits of apatite and phosphorite to
create phosphate fertilizers.

The Kola peninsula of the

Soviet Union is the largest source of phosphate in the
world.

The Soviet Union is probably the largest producer of

superphosphate fertilizers in both absolute and per capita
terms.

In the manufacturing of nitrogenous fertilizers the

Soviet Union does not do as well.

Nitrogenous fertilizers
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require more sophisticated technology, much of which the
Soviet Union bought from the West.

The Soviet Union is

close to the United States in absolute terms but is behind
·several West European countries in per capita terms. 22
The chemical fertilizer industry is the foundation of
the chemical industry.

The Soviet leadership recognized the

importance of fertilizers, and in March 1965 various resolutions

~were

passed by the Central Committee which put the

official stamp on the change of emphasis in favor of a new
agricultural policy.

The policy called for the implemen-

tation of the following measures:
a) emphasis on "intensive" methods of stimulating
output increased by application of fertilizers
b) a land improvement program of draining humid
areas and irrigating dry areas
c)

increased investment in agriculture,
~griculture supp~~ting industries and rural
infrastructure

One major agriculture program which required the use of
fertilizers was the Non-Black-Earth-Zone (NBEZ) of the
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

This area

makes up about one-fifth of the agricultural land in the
Soviet Union and nearly a quarter of the population.

It is

an area which does not have the best soil quality, is low in
natural fertilizers, and is high in acidity and waterlogging.

The development of the land is needed because it

is closer ·to the centers of consumption of agriculture and
agriculture-supporting industries, including the fertilizer
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industry.

This zone has a relatively frequent rainfall

which makes fertilizers fully effective. 24
Chemical fertilizers are based on four main groups:
a)phosphatic,

b)potash,

c)nitrogenous, and d)complex

fertilizers containing all three main elements.
TABLE ONE
AVERAGE YEARLY GROWTH IN FERTILIZER PRODUCTION, IN %
1966-70

1971-75

1976-80
9.65

Fertilizers, total

12.1

10.2

Nitrogenous
Phosphatic
Potash

14.9
9.4
11.7

9.5
13.35
15.75

9.65
14.75
6.35

Source: The Transfer of Technology to Socialist Countries
The growth of phosphatic fertilizers has been growing fast
because Soviet agronomists believe that phosphatic fertilizers need to be increased in relation to nitrogenous fertilizers and potash.

Simple phosphatic fertilizers are

produced mostly by indigenous technology.

Domestic tech-

nology has been relied on because the extraction and purif ication of the rock has to be adapted to the specific local
conditions and therefore cannot be developed abroad.

They

have recently bought several phosphoric acid plants from the
West to produce more sophisticated fertilizers. 25
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TABLE TWO
STRUCTURE OF PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER PRODUCTION, IN %
1970

1975

100.0

100.0

100.0

Fertilizers

98.7

92.2

90.3

Straight Fertilizers
Single superphosphate
~riple superphosphate
Slag

86.6
63.6
21.3
1.7

55.7
39.5
15.2
1.0

36.0
16.0
19.5
0.5

Complex Fertilizers
Nitroammophoska
Ammophos
Nitrophoska
Nitrophos
Nitroammophos
Crystal in
Liquid Complex Fertilizers

11.2
1.5
3.5
1.9
3.1
1.1

36.5
2.4
26.4
1.6
2.8
3.2

54.5
11.9
17.2
4.0
2.1
1.1
0.3
7.7

7.8

9.7

Total

Feed Phosphates

1980
(plan)

0.1
2.2

Source: The Transfer of Technology To Socialist Countries
Potash fertilizer production is also based on
indigenous technology since it is a relatively simple
procedure which in many cases has had to be adapted to local
conditions.

Most of the potash is in the form of potassium

chloride and in recent years the Soviet Union has invited
Western countries to bid on building a plant with a capacity
of two million tons per annum of potassium chloride.

It is

too early to tell if this recent development is a
significant break with traditional policy of using indige~

nous technology.

The production of phosphate and potash
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fertilizers used relatively simple procedures, and the
Soviets have not had to depend upon imports. 26
Ammonia is the key item to all nitrogenous fertilizers.
Ammonia production in the USSR has been heavily dependent
upon imports from the West.

The importance of this product

is matched by the priority it has enjoyed with regard to
access to Western imports.
izer

p~oduction

To increase nitrogenous fertil-

a major expansion of ammonia output was

required, since all nitrogenous fertilizer production is
based on ammonia as an intermediate.

Processes using natu-

ral gas as a feedstock are particularly desired in view of
their increasing exploitation of natural gas deposits.
Fertilizers that have high concentrations of nitrogen are
urea and some complex fertilizers. 27

See Table Three.

The degree of sophistication of different processes
used in making nitrogenous fertilizers varies.

Technical

changes in ammonia production have sharply increased the
optimal size over the last fifteen years.

The tanks,

tubes,

and compressors used in large ammonia plants require that
they meet narrow tolerances. 28
In the area of complex and concentrated fertilizers the
dependence on Western technology has been high.

This seems

to substantiate that the more complex the technology, the
greater the dependence upon Western technology.

Prior to

the launching of the "chemicalization" drive the Soviets
relied heavily on straight fertilizers,

most of which were

17,400

13,064

1977

33,400

Source: Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations

1985 projection

1980 plan

20,200 min

14,740

16,000

11,998

1975

28,000-30,400

11,140

13,500

10,173

1973

22,800

5,890

10,000

7,638

1970

1979 plan

3,300-5,900

3,640

5,000

3,814

1965

20,200 min

15,740

13,600-14,000

4,600-6,700

1,040

1,040

1,800

1,384

1960

Capacity of
'Western' plants
installed
(cumulative)

Total
capacity

Total
output

Capacity
of plants imported
from the West
(cumulative)

SOVIET AMMONIA PRODUCTION, CAPACITY,
PLANT IMPORTS AND PRODUCTION ON WESTERN , PLANT
1960-85 ('000 tpa NH3)

TABLE THREE

-- 15,000 min

11,800-13,700

10,200-10,500

3,200-5,000

· 2,500-4,200

750 min

Output from
'Western'
plants

"'
Q)
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low quality.

The Soviets have depended more on Western

technology to produce complex fertilizers than the other
forms.

The Soviets are most likely to import complex fer-

ti 1 izer plants in the future because they are a more
efficient variety of fertilizer. 29
The raising of Soviet agriculture production and yield
has been a priority aim of the Soviet economy since Stalin.
One

of~

the major ingredients to help boost agriculture pro-

duction has been the growth of the fertilizer industry.

The

nutrients needed in the soil to support plant growth are
fixed nitrogen

(N),

phosphorus

(P 2 o5 ),

and potassium

(K 2 0).

Intensive agriculture requires that these nutrients be added
artificially.

These nutrients can be delivered in a variety

of ways. · They are usually delivered in substances which
have high nutrient content and/or in a combination of the
nutrients in one fertilizer.

The latter type of fertil-

izer in the West is often referred to as a "complex"
fertilizer. 30
Soviet development of complex fertilizers has lagged
behind the West and until the 1960s were not produced at
all.

The main aim of Soviet policy has been to increase the

supply of concentrated forms of the three primary nutrients
and to create complex fertilizers containing two or three of
the nutrients.

The Soviet Union has large supplies of the

raw materials that are required to create these nutrients:
naptha, coke oven gas or natural gas (for nitrogenous

30
fertilizers),

apatite (phosphate), and brine deposit and

syl vinte ores

(potash). 31

Soviet policy-makers in the early 1960s aimed to intraduce production of a whole range of products in their
"chemicalization" drive.

In 1960 the Soviet Union produced

no compound fertilizers, no triple superphosphate and only
104,000 tons of urea and 136,000 tons of liquid ammonia.
Their total capacity in 1960 was 17 million tons per annum
;-

(tpa).

At the start of the "chemicalization" drive in 1958,

the Soviets produced only 14 million tons per annum.

The

1959-1965 Seven-Year Plan predicted that the Soviet Union
would produce 100 million tons per annum of total fertilizer
output by 1970.
million tons.

This number was later revised down to 80
The Soviet Union would achieve its goal by

extending capacity at existing plants by 20 million tons per
annum and building fifty-five new plants: twenty-eight for
nitrogenous fertilizer; nineteen for phosphate; six for
potash; and two for phosphate rock. 32
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TABLE FOUR
PRODUCTION OF CONCENTRATED AND COMPLEX FERTILIZERS
% SHARE IN TOTAL PRODUCTION
1970

1975

100.0

100.0

100.0

61.1
29.8
4.6
26.7

65.2
27.9
4.0
33.3

62.0
27.6
7.2
27.2

Complex fertilizers, total

4.6

13.0

30.0

Share of nutrient content
in complex fertilizers, %
nitrogen, N
phosphorus, P 2 05
potassium, K2 o

1.6
1.6
1.4

4.5
8.1
2.3

7.8
14.8
4.2

Fertilizer, total
Concentrated, total
nitrogen
phosphate
potash

1980
(plan)

Source: The Transfer of Technology to Socialist Countries
The Soviet Union could have developed the chemical
industry by itself or with the aid of other Eastern Bloc
countries, but this would have been more costly.

The fer-

tilizer industry in the West had to solve production problems of urea which were not solved until the 1950s.

The

maximum size of ammonia plants, which is usually the optimum
size, has been increasing rapidly since the 1960s.

The

Kellogg process, which is used in the manufacturing of
complex fertilizers, has become very important and today is
responsible for over half of the ammonia output.

The

processes of complex fertilizers are sophisticated and
evolving rapidly.

Many of the technological changes that

32
are taking place are not great changes but they have an
economic impact which is considerable.

These changes in

technology are "occurring in areas where Soviet applied
research and development was especially backwards." 33

The

potential gains from trade through imports of Western machinery and know-how has been strong.

The Soviet Union has

used Western machinery and know-how to become the largest
producer of mineral fertilizers, but utilization of chemical
fertilizers has lagged behind the West. 34
A lag of about three years occurs between placing an
order and completion of installation for ammonia plants.
This is less time than for most other types of chemical
plants.

In the late 1970s half of the Soviet ammonia

output was created in Western-designed plants.

The Soviets

rely upon the West because there is a high savings obtained
by using the Kellogg and Chemico large-plant processes.

The

high costs and difficulty for the Soviet engineer and East
European design engineer and manufacturers of replicating
existing Western plants makes it less expensive for them to
import plants, especially when Western contractors compete
to supply the plants on favorable terms. 35
The gains from trade involved in ammonia plant imports
come from technology transfer based on the detailed design
engineering expertise of Western specialists and plant construction.

The basic technology underlying the plant design

is contained in the Kellogg and Chemico ammonia processes.
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The Soviets, in this instance, are not as much interested in
buying fundamental know-how as they are in receiving the
more empirical and experience-based expertise of the specialist contractors and the detailed design work from
Kellogg and Chemico.

In some of the contracts Soviet orga-

nizations participate in the design and/or assembly work
which presumably helps them to learn. 36
The Soviets may still be dependent on the West for
large imported ammonia plants as a result of weakness in the
Soviet metallurgy and metal-working capabilities.

The

Soviet production of wide-diameter pipe is small and the
pipe is · necessary.

The relevant skills, know-how, and manu-

facturing capabilities probably are in the Soviet Union but
are used in the defense sector. 37
In the complex fertilizer production, imported technology was of vital importance, 13.9 percent of the total
fertilizer output was in the form of complex fertilizers in
the 1970s.

There was little indigenous . research and

development by the Soviets of complex fertilizers and almost
all of the production came from imported plants.
of the Soviets' complex fertilizers,

The output

according to Hanson,

for Western-built plants were operating at about seventyfive percent capacity. 38
Thirty percent of the Soviet fertilizer output planned
for 1980 was to be complex· fertilizers.

They planned to

create eight to 10 million tons of nutrients.

This meant

34

that Western plants were expected to continue to produce the
great bulk of complex fertilizers. 3 9
Organic Chemical Industry
The

~odern

chemical industry depends upon heavy organic

chemistry, the production of essential feedstocks to manufacture synthetic materials and other organic end-products.
Many of these industrial processes are based upon petroleum
i"

and have only become widely diff.used since the end of the
Second World War.

This form of chemistry requires special

technology and the extent to which a country can assimilate
these technologies, the more developed the chemical industry
must be.

The Soviet Union produces less than half the

amount that the United States produces.

It is difficult to

determine how successful the Soviet Union has been in this
area because it does not regularly release this information.
The Soviet Union does not release the structure of the raw
material base comprising oil, coal, natural gas and other
sources that are used in the manufacture of the chemicals.
The absence of satisfactory production figures suggests that
the manufacture of heavy organic chemicals in the Soviet
Union may not be as highly involved as the West. 40
The Soviet Union was slow iri switching to a petroleumbased chemical industry.

It was more dependent on coal and

fermentation as its main sources of organic chemicals.

The

Soviet Union was slower to switch to petroleum-based
chemicals because the petrochemical industry was relatively

35
neglected.

The petrochemical industry was neglected due to

underdeveloped technology and perhaps to reconcile the
petrole~m

priorities that belong to

products, should it be

used as a fuel source or for organic chemistry. 4 1
TABLE FIVE
THE PROPORTION OF SYNTHETICS IN TOTAL OUTPUT
OF MANMADE FIBERS (%)

USSR
USA
FRG
Japan
UK
France

1950

1960

1965

1970

5.4
8.9
0.5
0.4
2.5
2.0

7.1
39.7
18.5
21.4
22.7
27.4

18.9
53.8
39.2
43.2
37.8
40.1

26.8
72.3
68.8
66.3
56.3
57.2

Source: The Technological Level of Soviet Industry
, In areas where the Soviet Union has had high technological skills they have been able to learn from Western
technology at a high rate.

In areas where they are lagging

and the Soviets have imported large amounts of foreign
technology,

their learning ability has been poor.

"High-

technology imports have not visibly improved the Soviets'
ability to innovate on their own, in some instances the
opposite has occurred." 42

The reason for such poor

absorption lies in part with the political and economic
structure of the Soviet Union.

There have been several

attempts at reforms by the Soviet Union but with little
effects. 43

Attempts to control high-technology of
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non-military related technology and erect barriers of trade
between the West and the Soviet Union have been attempted.
"The most effective barriers to technology transfer are
those erected by the Soviets against themsel ves."44
The Soviet Union's che.mical industry has pursued a
program of massive imports of equipment and technology
especially in the areas of _synthetic fibers, plastics, and
synthetic
rubber.
,.

The Soviet Union's dependence is so great

.in areas of complex synthetic material that Western equipment accounts for two-thirds of their entire output of
polyethylene, polypropylene, polyester fiber, and acrylic
fibers.

The Soviet Union has had a rapid growth in the

number of engineers and scientists trained in chemistry in
the 1960s and 1970s.

The Soviet Union has also increased

its number of chemistry research institutes during these
years.

Even with the rapid growth in the number of people

trained in chemistry and the increase in research institutes, the Soviet Union has continued to be reliant on
Western imports.

This reliance on imports has inhibited the

growth of indigenous Soviet research and the development of
newer branches of chemistry. 45
The transfer of technology in the chemistry industry
has not been enough to give the Soviet Union an independent
innovative capability that can contribute to further advances in the chemical industry.

The importation of

technology in the chemical industry may even have retarded
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the growth of Soviet capabilities.

Only further continued

reliance on continued imports will enable the advance sector
of the chemical industry to continue to progress at its
present rate. 46
The Soviet Union imported foreign technology in an
attempt to rapidly catch up with the West.

The ability of

the Soviet scientists and engineers has depended more upon
the

lev~l

they already had achieved before the massive

arrival of foreign imports than upon the new technology they
imported.

This has led to the Soviets' stagnation and

continued dependence because they rely more on foreign imports than on their own innovators. 47
Studies of the Soviet Chemical Industry
Philip Hanson's Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western
Relations looks at the chemical industry in the Soviet Union
and how Western technology transfer has affected it.

Hanson

interviewed the executives of seven British chemical and
chemical plant companies in 1978.

The companies' contracts

with the Soviet Union ranged from the late 1950s to the mid
1970s.

Twenty-seven of the thirty-two contracts were for

turnkey projects, either for totally new plants or for an
addition to an existing chemical ·plant. 48
The survey found the negotiations of the main contract normally to be a difficult exercise.

Usually the

specialist plant contractor was working for a chemical
company which was the licensor of the process plant to be
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built.

The contractor usually coordinates machinery

deliveries from different equipment manufacturers.

Many of

the projects have unique features which require extensive
detail design engineering for the specific project.

The

delivery of the equipment is phased over a long period of
time and, thereafter, the delivery and . installation phases
commonly overlap.
companies

to

The contracts require the chemical

perform design, supply, supervisory erection

and commissioning of the new plant.

This means that the

company work is not finished until the plant is commissioned
and handed over to the Soviet government.
of the plant is a major,

multi-~tage

The commissioning

procedure involving

checking of installed equipment, test runs of parts of the
plant, debugging, and minimum-load testing of full-cycle
operation before the first full test run.

These systemic

and procedural factors affect the lead-times and other
aspects of assimilation substantially. 49
The lead-time of the twenty-six turnkey projects in the
survey, on the average, was six years and ten months.

These

types of projects in the West would take about two and onequarter to three and one-half years, this meant that it took
three and one-half to four years longer to complete the
plants in the Soviet Union. 50
Once the company handed over the operation of the
completed plant the manning level was found to be higher
than most European levels.

The excess in manning levels was
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from fifty percent to seventy percent.

The output levels on

a completed plant after it was handed over in some cases had
fallen below levels that had been guaranteed.

In the cases

of nine plants it was found that they were operating below
the guaranteed level, and four plants were above the
guaranteed output. 5l
The respondents almost universally agreed that the
Soviet initial inquiries were vague and unspecific.
this reason,

For

many companies did not recognize that a request

had been made.

The Soviet requirements for detailed design

documentation were regarded as extremely heavy and so were
details for operating procedures.

This resulted in a body

of operating instructions about four times bulkier than it
would be in the West. 52
Contractors thought that the Soviet inspection of
equipment in Britain before its acceptance for shipping to
the USSR was rigorous and on some occasions excessive.
Given the constraints of Soviet shipping schedules and port
facilities,

it was felt that on some occasions little

quibbles had delayed deliveries.

The Soviets insisted that

at least eight percent of the equipment should be delivered
and on the site before the assembly .and installation could
begin.

This meant that the delivery and installation phases

overlapped much more than in the West.

There were some

cases where the plant location was moved, and on other
occasions related plants were not brought into operation,
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therefore delaying operations.

Delays in construction work

were common and the labor force would fluctuate unpredictably.

The skill of the labor was found to be low by

Western standards.S3
The respondents · drew attention to one or more of the
negative influences of the Soviet assimilative capacity:
slow decision-making; the concern for slow decision-making;
the concernr for Soviet officials to guarantee themselves
against any possibility of being held responsible in case of
failure;

a general lack of entrepreneurship; and a persis-

tent tendency to

overm~nning

which many respondents thought

was imposed on unwilling managers by Party-state machine on
"we 1 fare" grounds. S 4
The assimilation of Western technology by the Soviets
that came out in the survey showed that assimilation took
longer than in West European countries in the case of the
chemical industry.

In the case of chemical technology,

there was no sign of a systematic reduction in lead-time
with experience and manning levels on the high side while
output was less than expected.

The successful domestic

diffusion and modification of the chemical industry appeared
to be limited.SS

The plants in the survey,

though, got into

production and stayed in production and in some cases have
been operating well by Western standards.

Western imports

have transformed large parts of the chemical industry so it
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could produce a wide range of important products and therefore some diffusion has occurred. 56
The executives interviewed saw domestic priority
ranking as the major influence on the speed and efficiency
of assimilation.

Large projects that required large hard-

currency output were usually assigned high domestic priority, but this did not mean that the project retained a
certain priority ranking.

It was found that industrial

branches such as the chemical industry, which were addicted
to Western imported machinery, were able to get substantial
plant and know-how orders included in the hard-currency
import plan as a matter of routine.

These plants did not

always carry a high domestic priority.

The evidence showed

that the average lead-time for import intensive projects was
less than for indigenous projects in the chemical industry.
This may have been because of the superior supply and coordination skills of Western contractors, but it may also have
been that a higher domestic priority was given to imported
plants than to domestic plants. 57
Hanson looked at other studies on the Soviet chemical
industry.

He found that, in a study by Sominskii and others

on 132 chemical projects, the results showed that projects
using domestic research and development tended to take
fifteen years.

The total lead-time for a first time pro-

ject, from research, development, testing, and evaluation
through assimilation was five years longer for domestic
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plants as compared to imported Western plants.5 8

Martens

and Young's study found that Soviet indigenous inventions in
the technical area of chemistry had the longest implementation lead-time of eighteen technical areas.

Martens and

Young found two interpretations of the role of Western
technology.

One was that Western imports were advantageous

because they reduced lead-times that would be much greater
in their absence.
~

The second interpretation was that in the

long run a continuous heavy reliance upon Western imported
technology has caused the Soviet Union to give domestic
research and development ·a low priority, which caused it to
have a low performance.

This has caused the Soviet chemical

industry to remain dependent on the West for innovative
technology. 59
Thane Gustafson's Selling the Russians the Rope?
Soviet Technology Policy and U.S. Export Controls studied
several Soviet industries including the chemical industry.
Gustafson studied the research and development ability of
the Soviet chemical industry.

The research and development

method that he studied was the scientific-production
association

(naucho-proizvodstvennoe ob'edinenie or NPO)

which is patterned after Soviet observations of American
high-technology corporations. 60
One of the best known NPOs, Plastpolimer, is a
Leningrad-based chemical association and is a model for
other chemical institutes to follow.

Plastpolimer is the
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production facilities.

This meant that Okhtinsk was forced

to displace old production techniques and stop production
while retraining and retooling took place.

This caused

serious management problems because Okhtinsk continued to
have to meet its production targets.

The two companies were

told to work together but were both given different proauction targets.

These problems continued for three years

until ther local district off ice of the Party apparatus
picked a strong chairman, Mr. Popov, to run Plastpolimer.
Popov was a former director of the design bureau that had
become part of Plastpolimer.

Popov lobbied for greater

cooperation between the two units but met resistance from
the local Party hierarchy.

The district off ice of the Party

defended Popov for his innovative procedures.

The Okhtinsk

plant's production targets were brought more in line with
the objectives of Plastpolimer but not completely.

Okhtinsk

continued to produce plastic toys but other obsolete products were cut.

By late 1979 only forty-three percent of

Okhtinsk production output consisted of thermoplastics,
which is what Plastpolimer was designed to make.
Plastpolimer by Soviet standards was considered to be one of
the leaders in its fiela. 62
The General Director Z.N. Poliakov sounded discouraged
in 1979, complaining that Plastpolimer's performance was
based on · the success of meeting monthly and quarterly output
plans,

just like any other industrial plant.

Plastpolirner,
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though, was designed for research.

Having to meet produc-

tion targets turned his job into an ordinary enterprise
director, and research scientists into production supervisors.

This reduced the scientists' ability to adapt and

learn from foreign technology and to move beyond it, and
generate their own.

Plastpolimer and other facilities like

it were designed to be dedicated to the task of innovation
and to

a~similate

foreign technology, that is, its ideas and

know-how rather than to produce finished products. 63
Plastpolimer has not been able to move beyond Western
technology or even able to duplicate it without Western
assistance.

The reason Plastpolimer has not developed

strong independent capacities might be the result of policy
choices made by the ministry.

Another reason might be that

the cost of Western technology has been more attractive than
domestic development. 64
Gustaf son believes that NPOs can succeed if they become
"truly integrated units and be able to influence the later
stages of the innovation cycle, 1165

but that NPOs do not

have the necessary high-level of support needed to achieve
their potential.66

Once NPOs are established they end up

being loaded down with output plans and heavy production
targets.

The result is that NPOs no longer are research

institutes because production becomes more important than
research and development. 67
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Ronald Amann, Julian Cooper and R.W. Davies' The
Technological Level of Soviet Industry found that the soviet
Union trailed well behind the Western countries in the
creation of synthetic materials.

The Soviet's plastic in-

dustry has expanded rapidly and has caught up some, but what
is truly peculiar about plastic industry is the continued
growth of the traditional plastics and resins.
Union

ha~

The Soviet

followed a pattern of remaining dependent on non-

polymerised raw materials.

In Western countries polymerised

materials make up well over half of the synthetic fiber
output, while in the Soviet Union, polymerised materials
make up only one third of the synthetic fiber output. 69

In

the early 1970s the Soviet chemical fibers industry was
still dominated by the viscose process, which was assimilated during the inter war period. 70
Since the Second World War the Soviet Union has become
the second largest producer of chemicals.

The Soviets'

chemical industry has grown quickly but it is also because
the Soviets have increased inorganic chemicals and fertilizers, but not so rapidly as in plastics and fibers.

The

Soviets have made rapid progress in the traditional chemical
industry, but its performance in tne more sophisticated
field has been less impressive. 71

See Table Six.

Most Western nations are net exporters of chemical
plants and chemical products, especially in areas that
require sophisticated technology.

The Soviet Union is an

'

676.4
473.3
203.0

Artificial and Synthetic
Fiber Total

Artificial Fiber

Synthetic Fiber

287.0

543.0

830.0

72.3

2,230

1973
1975

629.0
459.0

365.0

1088.0

96 .. 8

3,309

1977

590.0

955.0

90.2

2,842

Source: The Technological Level of the Soviet Union

6 1 .. 4

1,864

Mineral Fertilizer Total
Millions of Tons

Synthetic Resin and
Plastic Masses

1971

PRODUCTION OF MAJOR TYPES OF CHEMICAL OUTPUT
(UNITS IN THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS EXCEPT WHEN INDICATED)

TABLE SIX

~

-.....J
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importer of chemical plants and chemical products except in
the inorganic chemicals and simple fertilizers.72

The

fertilizer industry is the Soviet Union's only major branch
in the chemical industry to be a net exporter and have a
trade surplus.

Even in this area though, the Soviet Union

tends to export simple fertilizers and minerals and impor t
more sophisticated agricultural chemicals. 73
The

~oviet

Union is a net exporter of basic organic and

inorganic acids, coke chemicals, and wood chemicals due
largely to its trade with Eastern Europe and many Third
World countries.

These exports are not enough to off set the

substantial imports of alkalis, plastics, and other chemical
products.

The Soviet Union remains dependent upon imports

of chemical products, especially those requiring technologically advanced manufacturing processes.

There has

been a steady upward trend in the proportion of chemical
products in the total trade with the West. 74
The Soviet Union is a substantial net importer of
chemical plants and equipment and therefore depends on
foreign countries to increase its technology in the chemical
industry.

In the 1960s, foreign plants were responsible for

over one-third of the chemical equipment introduced into the
Soviet economy.

The Soviet Union imports from both East

Europe and the west.

The Soviet Union imported large and

expensive chemical plants and equipment from the West in the
1960s, which produced technologically sophisticated products
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such as, petrochemical intermediates, plastics, agricultural
chemicals, pesticides, complex fabrication, and man-made
fibers. 75
Soviet dependence upon the West for new technology in
the chemical industry raises two intriguing questions:
"Whether the Soviet Union will be in a permanently weak
position in terms of its ability to catch up with the West
in chemical technology; and how competitive its end products
are. 1176

Western engineers who have worked on Soviet con-

struction projects believe that imports of Western plants in
themselves will not be sufficient to allow the Soviets to
close the technological gap.

Many Western firms bring

everything into the Soviet Union and the Soviets have little
to do with the building of a plant.

This means that the

plant is functional but there is little learned about the
building of a plant by the Soviet Union.

This means that it

will take the Soviet Union longer to master the technology
and when they have, the United States and the other Western
countries will have moved on to more sophisticated products. 77

"The lesson here seems to be that the technology

gap in chemical processes can only be narrowed by a native
research and development effort culminating in successful
innovation, which rapidly builds upon assimilated Western
know-how. 1178

"On the second point, competiveness in the

manufacture of end-products, there seems little doubt that
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the innovating country enjoys considerable advantages in the
short and medium term. 1179
There has been a considerable output of scientific
research by the Soviets, but the quality of their research
work does not have the same impact as Western works.

"The

Soviet research effort does not seem to have generated any
really important and original innovations, which could be
successfully
scaled up to mass production. 1180
r

Most chemists

believe that Soviet chemical research contains quality work
comparable to Western works, but this work is usually buried
in with inferior quality material. 81
The Soviet Union is a country often depicted as being
cut off from the main information stream of the world.
Science, and therefore the Soviet Union suffers loses in the
circulation of ideas.

The Soviet scientists' lack of direct

contact with their Western counterparts has been a problem.
The language barrier has been an obstacle to communication
at times, but its impact should not be exaggerated. 82
Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper's Industrial Innovation
in the Soviet Union finds that laboratory research plays a
major role in the chemical industry in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union tends to allocate tne largest share of
resources to research rather than to development.

Unlike

other industries where designs are based on already existing
components, and therefore the development stage is most
important, the chemical industry must deal with chemical
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processes that are based on substances and/or reaction whose
properties are not known in detail.

Laboratory experiments

are required to select the end product which is most
favorable. 83
Fundamental research is the first stage and it can be
divided into two groups, theoretical research and exploratory or mission-oriented research.
hopes to

f~nd

Theoretical research

new chemical principles and its practical

applications.

Exploratory research is concerned with the

systematic screening of substances.

In Soviet research

institutes, the ratio between theoretical and exploratory
research in chemistry is roughly one to three. 84
Applied research follows from fundamental research and
it is concerned about the detailed elaboration, on laboratory equipment,

of the optimal variant of the process which

has been established theoretically during the first phase.
Applied research absorbs a higher proportion of research and
development resources in the chemical industry than in any
other science-based industry. 85
In Western countries the chemical contractors combine
responsibility for design and construction, but in the
Soviet Union they are handled by different groups.

The

construction of a Soviet chemical plant is carried out by
organizations that are subordinate to the Union-republic
ministers of construction.

Then the plant is officially

accepted for start-up by a state commission of experts
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appointed by the Ministry for the Chemical Industry.
Soviet Union,

In the

the start-up and modification of the new plant

is undertaken by a special State Engineering-Technical Trust
in association with the capital project institutes on whose
design the plant had been based. 8 6
Once a plant is completed and handed over to its new
management the lengthy process of assimilation begins.

For

the research-production cycle, the assimilation phase is
I'

where they prove if they have accomplished their task.

The

new management often has to face the fact that the design
estimates of the plant's performance were exaggerated.

Once

a plant is brought on stream and has reached planned capacity, the cost and quality considerations tend to disappear
from the scene.

The first stage of assimilaton is governed

by Gosplan regulations,

the other phases are not.

capacity usually takes a plant, on average,

To reach

2.65 years, and

can drag on longer if the plant is accepted prematurely by
the ministry. 87
In the Soviet Union the assimilation period is divided
into three stages:

a) the period of start-up and adjustment;

b) the achievement of planned capacity; c) the achievement
of cost and quality parameters.

Soviet data shows that the

first phase lasted from one and one-half months to one to
1.5 years,

the second phase required one to 1.5 years and

the last phase requires one to 1.5 years.

The average
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assimilation time for the Soviet Union is approximately
three years. 88
The time taken to build a chemical plant, on average,
is from five to seven years and in some instances has taken
ten years.

In Britain and the United States the average

time for a large chemical plant is one or two years below
the Soviet average. · Considering that on technological and
other reasons, the economically useful lifetime of a
...

chemical plant in the West is estimated between ten and
eighteen years, it is clear t h at unplanned construction
delays is a major factor in holding back the introduction
and diffusion of new technology.

In terms of the prevailing

levels of technology, the Soviet's chemical plant can be
obsolete before it comes on stream. 89
There are many reasons which can be considered that
produce the sluggish performance.

The first reason is that

frequent changes in design appear to be endemic during the
final phases of the research and production cycle.

These

changes increase costs and drag out the construction period.
Many of t h e problems are caused by inaccuracies and mistakes
in drawings which are the failures to remove bugs from the
process during the development stage.

The resulting delays

can only lead to obsolescence which can only be slowed down
by further modification and delays.

When this occurs then

the original design is often changed radically from the
original design.

Other problems stem from the fact that
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construction work of new chemical plants comes under a host
of construction and assembly organizations.

Only eight to

twelve percent of the work is carried out by organizations
directly subordinate to the Ministry of the Chemical
Industry.

This can cause problems such as machinery

arriving on the site too early and being left to rust
because there are no buildings, drains are laid after the
erection

o~

buildings are underway, or equipment is supplied

that cannot be used. 90

Instead of using one main contractor

who assumes overall responsibility, the new enterprise must
deal with hundreds of individual suppliers who are not
coordinated to deliver supplies when needed. 91
In recent years the Soviet chemical industry resources
have been equal to or a little less than the research and
development resources of the United States.

The main prob-

lem for the Soviet Union lies in the organizational and
economic framework within which the resources are deployed.
Many of their problems have come from the absence of stimulus for innovation.

The industrial enterprises are guided

by a central plan which sets success criteria, which have
tended to breed conservative attitudes, and these attitudes
are difficult to change.

The central planners are forced to

be responsible for changes because the lower administrative
levels refuse to be responsible.

The conservative attitudes

of enterprise and the ambivalent attitude of the ministry
towards research and development has caused fragmentation of
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the research-production cycle.

The widespread problems of

the design and construction stages also are major problems
of reaching the rapid introduction of research and development results into production.9 2
The relations between research institutes and industrial enterprises has been troublesome.

The people and

institutes that are supposed to co9rdinate and direct scientific and technical progress either have no money, no power,
or no courage.

It is therefore difficult to overcome

administrative barriers the more complex the project.
Lacking real power over the implementation of policy the
ministers instead exert petty tutelage over the details of
the disbursement of funds.93
The priority level of the Soviet chemical industry in
resources has remained high over the last several decades.
The ability of the Soviet Union to catch up with the West
will depend on how effective its research and development
system can work.

It is popular in Western writings to show

that economic reforms have not succeeded in fully developing
a research and development system in the Soviet Union, and
therefore, economic reforms will continue to fail.

"Thus

massive purchases of Western plant ~nd equipment or fundamental systemic changes are thought to be the only viable
.
escape routes from technological
bac k war d ness. .. 94

If the

Soviet Union hopes to keep up with the West it must deal
effectively with its research and development system.
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CASE STUDY OF THE SOVIET PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
The Soviet Union's petroleum industry is important to
the country's economy.

The petroleum industry is one of the

Soviet Union's major energy suppliers and has grown rapidly
since the late 1950s.

The petroleum industry is also impor-

tant because it is a m_a jor earner of hard currency which the
Soviets need to continue to build their industrial base and
for agricultural products.

The export of petroleum is

responsible for almost fifty percent of all Soviet hard
currency earnings . 1
History of Soviet Petroleum Industry
Russia was a major oil exporter by the 1880s.

Large

oil discoveries were discovered in Baku in the early 1870s,
production increased quickly and Russia soon became Standard
Oil's main competitor in the 1880s.

Russia was the largest

producer of petroleum in the world between 1898 and 1902.
The high point for Russia was in 1901 when pre-revolutionary
Russian production was reached.

Russian oil production did

not reach that point again until 1929. 2
Russia tried to deal with its lagging oil production by
drilling new wells and by exploring new areas outside of the
Baku region.

In addition foreigners were allowed to come
61

62

into Russia bringing needed capital and technology.

New oil

drilling equipment was brought in to replace the old wooden
drills with modern metal tools.

It was difficult to drill

more than 300 feet using a wooden drill, but it was possible
to drill deeper wells using metal equipment.

Wells could be

drilled to 600 yards using metal equipment.3
Russian production continued to decline in part due to
the

failur~

nology.

of Russian companies to import enough new tech-

Refining and drilling techniques were rapidly

changing in the early part of the twentieth century, and few
Russian companies were able to keep up.

Russian oil com-

panies were caught up in the international corporate
scheming and rivalry of the period.

Price-cutting was a

common tactic of the day and many producers cut back on
their operations, and others went bankrupt. 4
Most damaging was the labor and civil unrest which hit
the Baku and Batum areas.
year between 1901 and 1905.

Oil worker strikes occurred every
What the strikers did not burn

or pillage, a reactionary group calling itself the Black
Hundred did.

The complex racial mixture of Tartars,

Armenians, Jews, Russians, and Moslem Turks in the area did
not help the tranquility of the

area~

In 1905, revolution

caused overall production to fall over 3 million tons and
for exports to be cut in half. 5
In 1917 the Bolshevik Revolution had an immediate
impact on oil production as oil production fell from 10.8

63
million tons in 1916, to 8.8 million tons in 1917.

This was

caused by worker unrest and their insistence on more control
over managerial decision-making.

On June 6, 1918, formal

confiscation of the oil fields was declared.

This led to

production falling even further to 4.1 million tons that
year. 6
In September 1918, the Turkish occupation of the Baku
region occurred, which provided an opening that many old
I"

investors had been waiting for.

In November 1918, the

British pushed the Turks out of the Baku area and attempted
to set up an independent state of Azerbaidzham.

This was

not soley an anti-Bolshevik scheme, but an anti-Russian step
to help protect Persia and India.

In May of 1920, the

Bolsheviks retook the Baku area. 7
The Bolsheviks had physical control of the area but
they soon discovered they did not have the technical nor
managerial skills of the foreigners or others who had
operated the oil fields.

Output levels continued to fall

until it reached its low point of only 3.781 million tons in
1921,

(a level not seen since 1889~) 8
The New Economic Policy (NEP) authorized extending

concessions to foreign companies.

The Barnsdall Corporation

was the first to sign an agreement to help rebuild Soviet
oil production in October 1921.

Other Western companies

followed and signed concession agreements.
nology helped increase production.

The new tech-

Advanced rotary drills
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and deep well pumps were brought in and by 1924 production
was up to 7 million tons.

Besides work on wells, foreign

help gave assistance to the building of a second pipeline
from Baku to Batum.

The French supplied the Schumberger

well-logging process and the American, German, and British
helped build refineries.

With the Western assistance, pro-

auction grew quickly and by 1930 production reached 22
million tons.9
After the Second World War foreign help was called in
to help reconstruct both oil fields and refineries.

Most of

the Soviet effort was directed at the reconstruction of the
Baku area.

The war, though, had a lasting effect on the

area and it never reached its pre-war high.

The Soviets

gradually began to move toward the Volga-Urals region.

Oil

had been discovered in this region in 1929, but had not been
exploited.

The Volga-Urals area output rose rapidly after

the Second World War and by 1949, was out-producing the Baku
region. 10
The Volga-Urals region's growth raised the Soviet Union
to the second largest producer of oil in 1961, ahead of
Venezuela and behind the United States.

By the mid-1960s,

the region was accounting for seventy-two to seventy-three
percent of Soviet total production.

The percentage of oil

produced for the Soviet Union in the Volga-Urals region

.

started to decline in 1965 as West Siberia was opened .
Absolute production for the Volga-Urals region reached its
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peak in 1975, and has steadily decreased over the last ten
years. 11
As the Volga-Urals started to decline, the West Siberia
fields came into full production.

During the Five-Year Plan

1971-1975, the development of West Siberian fields was
dominated by an upsurge of production at the supergiant
Samotlor.

Soviet planners have found it easier and more

efficient tp concentrate their development on a single
place.

With the start of production in 1969, production at

Samotlor had jumped by 10 million tons in 1970, to 86.5
million in 1975, and has leveled off at 130 to 140 million
tons.

The production of Samotlor during the Ninth Five-Year

Plan 1971-1975 represented sixty-six percent of the production increase in West Siberia and fifty-five percent for
the entire Soviet Union. 12
Samotlor was a rare find and Soviet planners have had
to start bringing in smaller fields to maintain incremental
output.

Development has concentrated on the immediate

vicinity of the Ob' River, which is the main transportation
route during the ice-free summer shipping season.

The two

main oil towns of Surgut and Nizhnevartovsk have grown from
isolated Siberian villages to urban centers of 60,000 to
70,000 population in the last two decades.

13

Transportation has been a major problem for these
cities.

Railroads and pipelines ·are the major forms of

transportation in these areas.

Construction has been
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difficult because of the conditions in the remote northern
swamps and the need to bring in ballast and other roadbed
materials from distant quarries.14
The high cost of construction has kept construction and
development down, and so Soviet planners have kept the
building of permanent settlements to a minumum.

They have

used the work-shift method, in which oil production workers
are ferried by helicopter from a base city like Surgut or
f'

Nizhnevartovsk to the isolated drilling sites where they
work for one or two weeks in makeshift dormitory settlements
before returning for an off period to their permanent place
of residence.

This has worked reasonably well as long as

they are close to a permanent city, but development is being
pushed further eastward and there is talk of building a
permanent city near the Kholmogory field.

The Soviets have

continued to search for oil in more remote places, building
cities and transportation as they are needed.

15

Until the Second World War, most of the gas produced
was either gas that came from the production of petroleum as
a by-product or gas derived from the gasification of coal.
During this time firewood was often a more important source
of fuel than gas.

The realization t0at gas was an important

fuel source led to important changes after the Second World
War.

During the war large fields were discovered in the

Volga-Urals, the Caucasus and Shebelinka in the central
Ukraine.

Not until the mid-1950s did the output of gas from
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gas fields exceed gas derived as a by-product.

The dis-

coveries iri Ukraine led to other finds in the Soviet Union.
As new gas fields were discovered, the gas derived from the
petroleum industry became a smaller percentage of total
production.

By the mid-1950s, it made up less than one-half

of the total production.

When the potential for gas was

finally realized, a network of gas pipelines was built, so
gas could be transported and become an important export
~

commodity to Eastern Europe and Western Europe.

By 1979,

the Soviet Union was thought to hold 39.9 percent of the
world's gas reserves. 16
Phases of the Soviet Petroleum Industry
The Soviet petroleum industry can be broken into six
phases:

exploration, drilling, production and enhanced

recovery, refining, offshore activities, and transportation.
The transfer of technology in these six phases is explored
below.
Exploration, Seismic Work
The Soviet Union has relatively few people who have the
skills to use advance exploration techniques.

This, along

with an inadequate stock of advanced . technological equipment
has handicapped the Soviets in their exploration for new oil
and natural gas deposits. 17

The exploration of oil and gas

usually takes place in three phases: regional surveys that
identify possible geological locations where hydrocarbons
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may be found; detailed geophysical surveys that evaluate
prospective sites that are found during regional surveys;
and exploratory drillings that test the findings of the
regional surveys and the geophysical surveys.18
Western observers believe that the Soviets possess an
adequate domestic capability to perform regional surveys,
but the domestic equipment they use to perform detailed
geophysica~

surveys is of comparatively low quality.

The

equipment is bulky, difficult to transport and inferior in
its accuracy.

The Soviet equipment has been adequate in the

past, but as the Soviets have to explore for oil at
increasing depths they will need higher quality seismic
equipment. 19
Geophysical exploration relies heavily on computers,
and, therefore, the Soviets have turned to the West for
computers, related software, and equipment.

The Soviets

have made major purchases of Western computer equipment
because it can be purchased in complete ready-to-use sets.
The Soviet Union detailed seismic work is still dependent on
traditional analog methods of analysis.

The analog method

provides good results, but these cannot be easily subjected
to further processing, as can be done on more efficient
digital computers.

The sale of Western computers to the

Soviet Union has played an important role in aiding the
Soviets to collect and
efficiently.20

~rocess

digital seismic data
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The Soviets do produce computers but they are
"essentially functional duplicates of IBM models."21

The

Soviets design their computers after Western computers to
minimize design decisions and to be able to use Western
software.

Software has long been a problem for the Soviets

and is an area in which they are extremely weak.

The

reasons they are weak in this area is largely systemic. 22
"The Soviet, economy is simply not structured to facilitate indeed, even to allow - the close and constant interaction
between users and suppliers which is necessary to the
implementation of appropriate software. 1123

The system users

are unable to communicate with the scientists, designers,
and theoreticians. 2 4
Through the purchases of Western equipment the Soviets
have acquired advanced techniques.

These new techniques

have allowed the Soviets to move ahead quickly, but these
are techniques that were current in the West in 1975.
1975,

Since

technology in the Western computer industry has in-

creased substantially.

The computers may not be state-of-

the art equipment by Western standards, but it has filled an
important gap in the Soviet ability to process geophysical
information.25
Much of the Soviet Union has already been explored, but
much of the exploration has been relatively

primitive be-

cause the Soviet geologists lacked the more advanced seismic
technology that has been recently developed in the West.
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The Soviet Union contains thirty-seven percent of all the
earth's sedimentary areas,

including its continental

shelves, which have the greatest potential for oil, and the
West Siberian Basin is one of the largest sedimentary basins
in the world.

In comparing sedimentary area the Soviet

Union has thirty-seven percent, the Middle East has eleven
percent and North America has two percent. 2 6
The

S~viet

technology.

Union hopes to explore using better foreign

The Soviets' domestic exploration equipment is

equivalent to that used by the United States in the 1950s
and operates poorly at depths greater than 2,000 meters.

In

the late 1970s they purchased from Geosource, an American
company, several units for mapping geophysical
information. 27
Most of the exploration equipment exported to the
Soviet Union has been computers and geophysical equipment.
The geophysical equipment has consisted of digital seismographic recorders, magnetometers, gravity meters, and hydrophones which have been used for prospecting.

Computers have

been exported that could handle the large amounts of data
that is associated with seismic surveying.

Most of the

computer hardware has come from American sources, while most
of the software has been furnished by the French.

28
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TABLE SEVEN
UNITED STATES EXPLORATION EQUIPMENT TRADE WITH SOVIET UNION
(IN U.S. DOLLARS,IN THOUSANDS)

Exploration
Geophysical
Computers
Total Exploration

1977

1978

1979

480.7

862.5

2,022.6

3,643.4

17,578.3

22,311.0

4,124.1

18,440.8

24,333.6

,.

Source: Department of Commerce
Drilling
Oil wells are drilled with a bit which is a tool that
bites into the earth as it creates a bore hole.

In the

early days of the oil industry the holes were dug by hand,
but this was soon replaced by a system which used a chiselshaped bit that moved up and down on the end of a rope and
simply pounded a hole into the

~arth.

Today technology has

progressed greatly and the oil wells are dug using sophisticated metals and alloys to create a wide variety of precision tools which are used on different types of rocks and
drilling conditions. 2 9
As drilling techniques developed, new technology and
equipment has come into place.

The ropes that were used to

raise and lower the drill bit were replaced by drill pipe,
which is still referred to as the drill string, made of
high-quality steel.

The muddy water that was used to pump
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into wells to keep the bit cool and flush out debris has
been replaced by "drilling mud" which is a chemically
designed mixture of water, clay, and chemicals.

Drilling

rigs are the hoists and derricks from which the drill bit
and pipe are suspended.

The drilling rig is responsible for

supporting, raising, and lowering the drill pipe and bit
into the well.

These structures have grown and today hoist

weights of peveral hundred tons.

Tubular steel casings have

replaced wooden stakes to form supports for wells and keep
them from collapsing.

Safety devices such as blowout pre-

venters have been added to keep wells from exploding when
gasses or liquids escape under high pressure.
instruments are now available.

Well-logging

"These are lowered into the

well on cables and measure the density and permeability of
the geological structure surrounding the well, allowing
geologists to estimate the quantity and recoverability of
potential reserves." 3 O
The quality of Soviet drill bits has long been a
problem for Soviet planners.

The Soviets have continued to

use "roller bearing" bits which are not as advanced as the
"journal bearing" bits produced in the West.

The roller

bearing bit has a number of small rotating elements, while
the journal bearing has two close-fitting parts.

The

journal bearing bits offer a larger surface area and last
.
b't
1 anger than the roller bearing
l
s. 31
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The Soviet Union is concerned about drill bit quality
and, therefore, purchased an American drill bit manufacturing plant from Dresser Industries.
fully operational, will be able to

This p+ant, once

p~oduce

100,000 bits per

year, with 86,000 being highly advanced tungsten carbide
insert bits.

Dresser will furnish plans for thirty-seven

separate bits to be produced in the plant. 32
The bits
produced in the Dresser-built plant are hoped
r
to last two to four times longer than Soviet-made bits.
This plant, once producing at full capacity, and without
additional rigs, has the potential to produce enough bits to
allow an increase in meterage drilled of ten to twenty
percent which could mean an increase of three to six percent
in oil production. 3 3
Soviet drill pipe has been adequate for wells down to
2,500 meters, but the pipe often fails at greater depths.
Soviet drill pipe does not perform well after 2,500 meters
because of the weight and stress at these greater depths.
The problem facing the Soviet Union, when it comes to drill
pipe production is that it is quantity, not quality, that is
stressed by Soviet planners.

This causes the pipe to have

defective threads and joints that cannot withstand extr e me
temperatures and fails to protect pipes from corrosion and
parafin buildup.

The poor quality of pipe can cause the

drill string to break, dropping the bit and other parts into
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the well, forcing the well to be shut down until the pieces
can be removed and replacement parts brought in.34
Drill pipe has been purchased by the Soviets from the
West. - It is generally accepted that the imported pipe is
used on deeper wells.

These deeper wells account for five

to ten percent of Soviet oil production.

The importance of

Western pipe will increase as wells increas~ in depth.35
The

S~viets

have always been frustrated by poor drill

bit quality and pipe quality.

So far the Soviets have been

successful in purchasing a drill bit plant from Dresser
Industries.

These drill bits should make it possible for

them to drill faster and deeper using their turbo-drill
system.

The Soviets have also bought foreign steel mills in

an effort to improve the quality of drill pipe.

They also

hope to purchase a foreign rotary drilling plant. 36
The Soviet Union produces most of its drilling rigs and
hoisting equipment itself.

The Soviet Union has been

improving both its quality and quantity of rigs and hoisting
equipment but it has not been able to achieve the right mix
of equipment.

The oil drilling association has complained

that it is over-supplied with rigs designed to drill greater
than 5,000 meters, but does not have . enough lighter rigs to
drill in shallower areas.

The Soviets are now switching to

a unitized rig; these rigs can be assembled by one crew
instead of several crews, are lighter, and can drill to
3,300 meters at a faster speed. 37

75

The Soviets have imported unitized rigs from the West.
The Soviets' desire to drill faster and deeper in this
decade will require them to import additional rigs.

The

demand for oil rigs will continue and the Soviets will
continue to import. 38
Soviet well-logging is considered to be poor.
be attributed to two problems:

This can

I

the use of the turbo-drill,

and the lack
of quality field instruments.
,..

The turbo-drill

produces erratic and irregular walls in the borehole.

The

irregular walls have drilling mud packed into the cracks and
fissures of the wall, which makes it difficult to study the
actual geological structure.

Soviet well-logging equipment

essentially copies American equipment sent to the Soviet
Union during lend-lease and after the Second World War.
Soviet research institutes have developed instruments that
are comparable to Western state-of-the art instruments, but
.
these have not been fully tested and put into
pro d uc t'ion. 39

The Soviet Union has imported well-logging instruments
from both France and the United States but not in large
quantities.

Wells which have used Western equipment in the

Soviet Union have been completed three to ten times as fast
and with greater accuracy.

To increqse overall logging time

in the Soviet Union would require them to import at least
enough equipment to equip 100 crews and allow Western tech.
t 40
nicians to train the crews how to operate the equipmen ·
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Blowout preventers, in the Soviet Union, are only used
when drilling in new areas, and in areas where underground
conditions cause high pressures, or where corrosion is expected to cause problems.

Once the initial wells have been

drilled they are rarely used.

The Soviets have imported

some blowout preventers from the United States but not in
large numbers.

The Soviets usually import blowout prevent-

ers from Romania which has recently bought an American
~

designed blowout preventer plant. 41
TABLE EIGHT
UNITED STATES DRILLING EQUIPMENT TRADE WITH SOVIET UNION
(IN U.S. DOLLARS, IN THOUSANDS)
1977

1978

1979

Pipe

1.9

404.7

579.2

Bits

147.2

Rigs

8,272.0

33,247.9

37,235.3

8,421.1

33,652.6

37,814.5

Total Drilling

Source: Department of Commerce
Production
Oil production can continue from a well after it has
lost its natural reservoir pressure by introducing secondary
and tertiary recovery techniques.

In 1980, over eighty-five

percent of the oil was obtained by the secondary recovery
technique known as waterf looding.

In West Siberia,

77
ninety-nine percent of the oil is obtained by waterf looding.
This has helped raise the initial recovery rate while
reducing the number of producing wells required per unit of
land.

This has allowed the Soviets to conserve capital by

reducing the outlays for drilling equipment. 4 2
Mechanical assistance is required to recover the oil
and water when waterflooding has occurred.

This is usually

accomplished with pumps such as the sucker-rod pump and the
electric submersible pump.

Sucker-rods work like plungers;

they are powered by surf ace pumps and have tubes that run to
the bottom of the well.
in deeper wells.

Sucker-rod pumps are less efficient

Electric submersible pumps, along with

their motors and electric cables are lowered into the well
itself.

They are used when high pumping rates are required.

An alternative to pumps is gas-lift equipment which pumps
gas into the oil column in the well bore. 43
The Soviet Union has a substantial capability for producing electric submersible pumps, but these require more
maintenance than their Western counterparts.

The American-

built submersibles can pump 1,000 tons of fluids per day and
can last five times longer than the Soviet built ones.

44

By 1978, the Soviet Union had purchased about 1,500
American pumps with deliveries staggered over several years.
It appears that the American pumps have a lifetime of three
to six months before they need major service.

The Soviets
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have asked for training in pump repair but the United States
has refused them so far.45
Since 1971 the Soviet Union has imported American-made
submersible pumps because they found them to be more ef f ective than native built pumps.

More and more pumps are being

needed as the Soviets continue to inject water into oil
fields in an effort to increase pressure so more oil can be
pumped out.

In the Volga-Urals region the water to oil that

is being pumped out is about fifty-fifty.

The Soviets are

also beginning to have water problems in the Samotlor field
in West Siberia. 4 6
Tertiary recovery methods are very expensive and are
relatively experimental even in the West.

The Soviets have

experimented with a variety of methods including steam
injection and polymer flooding.

The high cost of using

tertiary methods has been a major barrier to increased oil
production. 47
In the late 1970s, the Soviets turned to other methods
that had been used in the West for secondary recovery procedures.

The Soviets have turned to steam injection, which

is useful when breaking up high-viscosity crude oil which is
not affected by water injection.

The application of deter-

gents, carbon dioxide, and the injection of natural gas
instead of water has also been used.

The type of petroleum

determines which method should be used.

48
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The Soviets are having to import equipment costing
hundreds of millions of dollars from the United States and
other West European countries.

These different types of gas

lift processes are used to supplement reservoir pressure.
These processes have led to increased production in Grozny
and Baku after many years of falling production.

The pur-

chase of secondary recovery equipment has increased output
production in
some of the older Baku fields threefold from
r
300,000 to one million tons a year. 4 9
The Soviets have recognized that the use of water
injection is not suitable for Samotlor and Fyodorovsk
regions and therefore has signed a $226 million contract
with a French company to install a gas lift system.

The

Soviets are also putting this new learned technlogy to work
in other fields.

One year after the contract had been

signed, they claimed it was being used with good results. 50
In late 1977, the Soviets signed a $23 billion contract
with Pressindustria of Milan, Italy, for a plant to
manufacture 250,000 tons of non-ionic . surfactant a year to
enhance recovery.

A few months later they signed a $36

million contract to buy two carbon dioxide liquefaction
plants from Borsig, of West Germany . . Carbon dioxide is used
to increase the pressure in the reservoir.

51

The Soviets have been experimenting with several types ·
of recovery techniques.

The Soviets have purchased two C02

recuperation/liquefaction plants with the combined capacity
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of over 400,000 tons per year and a chemical surfactant
plant with a one million ton per year capacity, both from
West Germany.

The benefits of secondary recovery techniques

are still being explored through testing and experimentation
in the West as in the Soviet Union. 52
Refining
The quality of Soviet refined products has been poor,
the result of poor planning and the lack of investments into
this section of the petroleum industry.

The quality and the

mix of petroleum products has been low and the Soviets are
now trying to improve it.

Poor motor fuels and lubricants

have been responsible for a decrease in the efficiency and
1 if e span of machinery and it has led to increased main-

tenance and repairs.

The Soviets have also made attempts to

reduce the amount of oil and oil product losses that occur
during the refining process. 53
The octane of Soviet gasoline is between sixty-six and
seventy-two, which is well below the United States, which is
around ninety octane.

Soviet economists believe that the

cost savings from increased octane ratings would make fuel
and performance improvements through higher compression
.
.
.
th e re f.1nery. 54
ration
far exceed the cost of improving
The Soviets in the past have imported large amo nts of
refining equipment from Eastern Bloc countries.

The equip-

ment they have imported from the West has consisted of
complete refineries rather than parts.

The improvements
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that the Soviets are planning for the refinery industry will
require additional assistance.

The Soviets will require

Western assistance for microprocessors and minicomputers
that are used in refinery operations.

The Soviets need to

improve their secondary refining techniques such as hydrocracking and catalytic cracking.

These techniques do not

depend upon advanced technology but are dependent on computers. s s

H7drocracking and catalytic cracking are

techniques used to break up heavy hydrocarbon molecules to
form lighter molecules which are used in motor fuels and
aviation gasoline.S 6
Soviet imports for oil refining equipment has been
considerable over the last decade.

Most of the equipment

that they need to import is available on a worldwide basis.
The area in which the Soviets are most dependent on the West
is for the advanced microprocessors and minicomputer control
systems.

So far these systems have not been given a high

priority.

The Soviet Union has the ability to build the

hardware for such a system, but lacks the experience for
building the software and associated control devices. 57
It appears that "systemic constraints and incentives
will impede the development and introouction of computerized
refinery process control system much more than will problems
with the technology."S 8

Western imports may help improve

the efficiency of refine .ies, but for now the Soviets are
relying predominantly on domestic developments.

59
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The Soviet Union will continue to build new refineries,
especially in West Siberia and the East, near the source of
the supply of oil.

They will continue to improve the

refinery production mix and the quality of their products.
It is likely that the Soviets will continue to import
Western technology especially in the form of complete
refineries. 60
Off shore
The Soviet Union possesses extensive offshore oil
potential.

The Arctic, Baltic, Black, Caspian, and Okhotsk

Seas are the most attractive.

Drilling has taken place in

the Black and Baltic Seas, and in the Arctic water of the
Barents and Kara Seas on a limited basis.

Most of the

Soviets' experience has been in the Caspian Sea. 61
Exploration of the Caspian Sea has been going on since
the 1920s, but only recently has the Caspian Sea's full
potential been realized.

The Soviets have only recently

developed the capacity to drill in water deeper than 200
meters.

In 1975, the "28th April" deposit was a major

t in
. th e area. 62
.
.
.
d iscovery
and has since
spurre d interes

The Soviet domestic offshore capabilities need to be
greatly upgraded.

In the late 1970s the domestic stock

consisted of seven jackup rigs and two semisubmersible rigs.
Jackup rigs have hydraulically operated legs which are
extended down to the sea floor and then the entire rig is
raised clear of the water to permit drilling.

Modern
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jackups are limited to working in water 300 feet or less.
Semisubmersibles are built on pontoons and are floated over
the drill site.

Once over the drill site the pontoons are

partially flooded, which provides a stable platform from
which to drill.

These rigs are usually anchored into posi-

tion or employ a dynamic positioning system which keep them
over the drill site.63
The Soviet Union has lagged behind the West in offshore drilling and has ·turned to the West when their
domestic industries failed to do the job.

They have bought

semisubmersible offshore oil rigs, and the technical knowhow to build their own.

These rigs will operate not only in

the deeper parts of the Caspian and Black Seas, but also in
northern waters of the Barents, White, and Kara Seas.

The

Soviets have turned to foreign sources because of the
seriousness of their need to increase production. 64
Semisubmersible rigs have been purchased from Norway
and Japan.

A Japanese consortium has also provided several

jackup rigs for exploratory drilling off Sakhalin.

These

rigs were operated by Japanese-trained Soviets, and a
Japanese supervisor was on each rig. 65

The Soviets have

purchased sufficient geophysical equipment to outfit two
geophysical ships they brought from Mitsubishi of Japan.
The Soviets have hired Western geophysical ships to conduct
offshore surveys. 66
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The drill ships and other offshore assembled rigs are
supplied to the Soviet Union with American technology,
either made in the United States or through their overseas
subsidiaries and licensees.

The prime power used on the

rigs is usually diesel-electric, and these are supplied by
the major diesel manfacturers in the West.

Diving equipment

for the rigs has been furnished by the French and the United
States.

Th~

subsea blowout preventers are supplied by the

United States as well as the well completion stacks. 67
The Soviets have purchased or contracted for off shore
exploration, drilling, and production equipment from many
Western countries.

It has recently acquired its own

capabilities to build jackups and semisubmersibles from
Western technology imports.

The Soviets have contracted

with a Finnish firm for three drill ships for use in Arctic
waters.

These ships are based on Dutch design and are being

fitted with the latest Western technologies.

These ships

will give the Soviets their first deep drilling and subsea
completion capabilities. 68
Transportation
The Soviet Union is looking forward to a future of oi 1
and gas exports, to do so they must continue to modernize
their petroleum industry.

The Eleventh Five-Year Plan calls

for a massive reallocation of resources within the
industrial sector, in favor of energy.

In the past few

years energy has become the chief policy concern of the
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Soviet leadership.

The Eleventh Five-Year Plan sets very

ambitious targets for energy production, with natural gas
investment doubling.

This means an increase of 20 billion

rubles for the natural gas industry. 6 9
Investment in the energy sector during the Eleventh
Five-Year Plan is expected to increase by 132 billion rubles
which will be 85.6 percent of the planned increment for the
overall industrial
investment.
,.

Energy sector analysts in

the West question whether or not the Soviet energy

sector

can absorb these massive increases in funding over a short
period.

If the Soviet economy continues to grow as slowly

as it did during the late 1970s and early 1980s the energy
demand might even stagnate. 70
In the petroleum industry of the Soviet Union there are
certain key sectors in which Western technology plays an
important role.

The purchase of large-diameter pipe and

compressor station units are of immense importance. 71

The

Soviets have been dependent on the West for much of its pipe
which is larger than forty inches in diameter.

These pipes

are used in the main-line high-pressure transport system for
oil and natural gas and are of Arctic quality pipe.

The

Soviet steel industry is capable of P!oducing forty, fortyeight, and fifty-six inch pipe and a substantial amount of
the pipeline is domestically produced.

Pipeline, though, is

imported to avoid bottlenecks that occur from insuf~icient
production and because domestic pipe tends to be lower in
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quality.

The Soviets are improving their pipe production

capabilities by purchasing seamless pipe manufacturing
capabilities from French and German firms. 7 2
The Soviets have purchased pipeline boosters, pumping
stations, and gas compressors from the West, with gas compressors being the most important.

The Soviets do not

produce enough gas compressors domestically and those they
do are of lower quality and not as powerful as Western
...

models.

The Soviet Union has been importing gas-turbine-

powered compressors and equipment from the West in substantial amounts since 1973. 73

It is impossible to know how

much the Soviets have benefited from the Western technology,
but "one Western expert has estimated that pipe and compressor imports together may well have paid for themselves
within two years, given the acceleration of gas transport
capacity they allowed. 1174
The Soviet Union has purchased more than $10 million
worth of pipelines to large producing gas fields.

The

Soviets have plans for ten domestically produced pipeline
computer automation systems.

These systems will reduce the

amount of time needed to detect leaks, improve pipeline
maintenance, and improve the management of the flow of gas
and oil.

If these systems are introduced, and the Soviet

domestic industry is unable to produce the equipment in the
needed quantity and quality they may turn to the West for
assistance. 75
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TABLE NINE
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT TRADE WITH U.S.S.R.
(IN U.S. DOLLARS, IN THOUSANDS)

Pumps
Pump Parts
Gas Compressors
Total Comp/Prod

1977

1978

1979

3,674.3

1,241.9

9,979.7

11,743.9

242.9

17,613.2

5,432.3

5,937.8

20,850.5

7,422.6

27,592.9

Source: Department of Commerce
Studies of the Soviet Petroleum Industry
Thane Gustafson's The Soviet Gas Campaign discusses the
politics and policies of Soviet decision makers towards
natural gas.

Gustaf son states that, "One of the most impor-

tant reasons why Soviet leaders import Western capital
equipment is to give themselves a 'fast start' in a new
policy initiative, so they need not wait for sluggish
domestic producers to make the necessary innovations or
reach the necessary output capacities and quality levels
before forging ahead. 1176

Western technology helped

Khruschev launch his chemicalization drive in the 1950s and
Brezhnev when he expanded the automobile and truck industry
in the 1970s.

Soviet industry has not been incapable with

supplying what is needed, but turning to outside sources has
given the Soviets the flexibility that the command system
cannot supply. 77
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In the gas industry, foreign technology has been on the
leading edge of Soviet advances for many years.

Western

technology has supplied most of the advances involved in the
transmission of Soviet gas.

The Soviet gas industry has

moved towards larger and larger diameter pipe along with
higher pressure, and longer lines. 78 .
"Relying on foreign equipment suppliers tends to inhibit domestic innovation.

It takes time and additional

resources to absorb it properly into the domestic economy,
and while that process is going on it disrupts established
lines of supply. 1179

Western technology costs the Soviets

hard currency, and in the end they are not guaranteed that
the new technology is what they truly need. 80
For the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981-1985),

the plan

calls for an East-West export pipeline and for six domestic
fifty-six inch pipelines, as well.

The Soviets are relying

on Western equipment for a great deal of the pipeline network.

The Soviets will also have to import Western com-

pressor stations.

The plan calls for 320 new compressor

stations totaling 25,000 megawatts, of which 22,000 megawatts are supposed to be supplied by the Soviet domestic
industry.

This means that the domestic industry will have

to increase its output by 1,600 megawatts during the
Eleventh Five-Year Plan.

The Soviet planners may be over

optimistic about the ability of their domestic industry to
build gas-pipeline compressors, but it is not the first
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time.

In the last two five-year plans the Soviets had high

expectations of their domestic industry, only to turn to the
Western suppliers later in the plan when domestic output
could not meet the plan. 8 1
"The core of Soviet problems in economic decisionmaking is the malfunctioning of the planning system.

It

fails to provide policy makers with a clear and integrated
picture of

~he

choices before them and to provide implemen-

tors below with a coherent and realistic blueprint of what
they are supposed to do. 118 2
The gas campaign was poorly planned.

The targets were

set and the work was started before planners had figured
where the necessary equipment would come from.

The amount

of gas the campaign was to produce was more than the economy
would be able to absorb.

The plans called for more gas to

be produced than could be consumed and did not require
adjustments to be made to consume it, and which of two
fields to be used was not decided on until after construction started. 83
The high priority of the gas campaign did not spare the
gas industry the three classic problems of Soviet management.

"First, most Soviet industria~ ministries, being

large, vertically integrated hierarchies, do well at
focusing efforts on their major targets, but poorly at
meshing horizontally with other ministries.

Second, the

incentive system in which the Soviet ministries must operate
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encourages them to concentrate on intermediate indicators
of performance, often to the detriment of the final goals
th~

desired by the leaders.

Third,

and demanding for Soviet

~anagers

all." 84

targets are too numerous

to hope to meet them

This usually means they put the total output of

production first and product quality and reliability, spare
parts, and housing for workers in the background.85
The Sovjets are devoting seventy percent or more of the
new investment for the gas industry to pipelines.

This has

caused the Soviets to hold back investments in gas fields
and distribution centers.

The development of housing,

roads, power plants, and the urban infrastructure are behind
and do not meet the basic needs.

This, in the future,

may

slow the output of gas from West Siberia. 86
"For the Soviets to free themselves of foreign dependence will be expensive and will take at least another five
years of top-priority efforts.

Soviet industry faces a dual

challenge, to overcome the unreliability of low efficiency
of the existing pipeline network and simultaneously to move
up to the next generation of pipeline technology, which will
operate at 100 or 120 atmospheres instead of the present
seventy-five. 1187

The Soviets hope to use higher pressures

by the second half of the 1980s and are already domestically
producing a multi-layered pipe which will be able to handle
the higher pressures. 88
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The Office of Technology Assesment's Technology and
Soviet Energy Availability finds that the Soviet Union is
purchasing Western imports in a number of areas where it
produces large quantities of the same items that it is
importing.

The Soviet Union, for the most part, does not

lack the know-how to provide for itself, but it does not
produce enough high-quality equipment because "the structure
of its economy
and its incentive system are such that it has
,.
difficulty producing sufficient quantities of high-quality
equipment. 1189

Items purchased from the West usually are of

higher quality than those produced by Soviet domestic
industry.

Western equipment is imported by the Soviets to

compensate for the shortfalls of Soviet domestic industry. 90
Western equipment has clearly helped improve the Soviet
petroleum industry, but it is not known to what extent.

The

Soviets will not depart from past practice of importing
Western equipment and seeking hands-on training. 91

The

Soviets will continue to purchase Western equipment to
supplement domestic stock when demand runs high and/or purchase equipment for a specific difficult task.

Some of the

equipment that the Soviets have purchased will be used for
laboratory examination and duplicati?n, or to serve as
guides to correct problems in domestic stock.
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The Soviets have not purchased many items that are
basic to the petroleum industry, such as magnetometers,
gravimeters, mud-pumps, pipe insulation, and offshore
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floating production centers.

The omission of these can be

interpreted in a number of ways: "that the Soviet Union and
its Eastern Bloc allies have an adequate industrial base to
meet their needs, even if they are inefficient by Western
standards; lack of hard currency has forced policy makers to
choose other types of equipment which has higher priority;
or that the Soviets have made a policy decision that it
should remajn free of Western supplies in these critical
areas of the petroleum industry.

It is most likely that a

combination of factors is at work."93
The Soviets will continue to rely on Western imports
for large diameter pipe.

Imports of pipe have been con-

sistently large and seem to be needed because domestic
production is insufficient. 94

The Soviets have purchased

from the West a seamless pipe manufacturing plant, which can
produce 170,000 metric tons per year.

The pipe is necessary

as the Soviets hope to continue to bring more natural gas to
its consumers.95
Marshall I. Goldman's The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum:
Half-Empty or Half-Full? found that "if they can obtain the
foreign technology, the Soviets should be able to avail
themselves of some significant output gains through enhanced
recovery techniques. 11 9 6

Discoveries of new fields will

ensure increased output in a decade or so.

The Soviets will

have to put to better use enhanced recovery methods to
.

.

increase output in the near term.
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"A complete overhaul of the whole planning system would
go a long way towards postponing the depletion of Soviet
wells and increasing the discovery of new wells."98

There

are other less radical solutions that Soviet leaders can
turn to.

The Soviets can turn to enhanced recovery tech-

nology, and if they cannot invent new methods they can
import it from the West."99
The Soviets in the past have relied mostly on water
injection as a secondary recovery method; it has been used
on eighty-six percent of the wells.

Other alternative

methods that the Soviets have used are steam injection,
which is useful when breaking. up high-viscosity crude oil,
the application of detergents, carbon dioxide, and the injection of natural gas into the reservoir instead of water.
The skilled application of the proper technique on a well
can increase yields by fifty percent. 100
The Soviets have gradually started to utilize these
techniques, which meant importing most of the equipment,
costing hundreds of millions of dollars, from the West.

The

Soviets started to import secondary recovery methods in
1977.

Between 1976 and 1978, these methods were responsible

for only 0.4 percent of total output; by 1979, it had increased to two percent.

This was only the beginning, and

there are problems that the Soviets will have to face if
they wish to increase production significantly.

Each field

has to be custom-fitted with its own special enhanced
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recovery system.
of money. 101

This takes time, skill, and enormous sums

"The Soviets have a long way to go before they

have the incentives, know-how, or the equipment to take full
advantage of the potential that is available."102
The drilling range of the Soviet Union is 2,000 meters,
which is adequate, but future fields will be much deeper.
The Soviets' turbo-drill and seismographic systems cannot
reach depths between 2,500 to 5,000 meters where they hope
to find oil.

The Soviets are now using the new technology

they purchased from the West, and are having some positive
results. 103
The Soviets are developing some of the more difficult
sites as joint-development ventures with foreigners on
Soviet territory.

This shows how serious the Soviets are

about developing these fields.

Since the Second World War

the Soviets have only had joint ventures with foreigners
outside of the Soviet Union's territory.

Recently the

Soviet Union has talked about an ongoing production and
royalty relationship with the Bendix Corporation, but
nothing concrete has occurred.

This shows that the Soviets

are willing to make exceptions about foreigners operating in
.
104
the Soviet Union when it comes to petroleum exp 1 oration.
There have been other joint ventures off the coast of
the Soviet Union on the island of Sakhalin.

The Soviets, in

cooperation with the Japanese Petroleum Development
Corporation, finally found petroleum and gas in 1977, after
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a three-year search.

The Soviets' contribution was the work

site and labor, while the Japanese-led consortium contributed $170 million to finance the venture.

The Soviet Union

and the consortium will split the revenues on a fifty-fifty
basis if and when they become commercially profitable.105
The Soviet Union has been negotiating contracts with
British Petroleum, Phillips Petroleum, and Armco in which
the companies will set up operation on Soviet territory in
the deeper parts of the Caspian and Barents Sea.

A French

and British company has reportedly already been drilling in
the Barents Sea.

The Soviets hope that these deals will

start producing almost immediately with results in as little
as two years.

This amount of time is not unrealistic since

it only took this much time to start North Sea oi 1 production by many of these companies. 106
Some of these projects between Western companies and
the Soviet Union involve sharing any of the ultimate production,

especially if they find oil as opposed to natural gas.

This shows how important finding new petroleum deposits is
to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets in the past have been

sensitive to foreigners working in their territory and in
the past have rejected profit-sharing joint ventures.

The

fact that they are willing to make these exceptions shows
the high priority the Soviets put on finding new petroleum.
It appears that they are wi lling to compromise some of their
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idealogical principles to facilitate the search for new
oil.107
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper was undertaken to study the impact Western
technology has upon the Soviet economy, and how the length
of time an industry has been statused as a high priority
importer of Western technology has affected the Soviet
capabilities to innovate.

The study compared the chemical

and petroleum industries because they both have high priority status to import Western technology.

There is also a

time difference of about fifteen years between the time the
chemical industry (1958) became a high priority importer and
the time the petroleum industry (1973) became a high priority importer.
The history of both the chemical and petroleum industries showed that before the Soviet revolution in 1917, they
were dependent on foreign technology and that rnany of the
Russian industries were owned by foreigners.
Soviet revolution,

After the

the government turned to the West to help

rebuild their industries with the latest Western technology.
The Soviets again turned to the West for new technology
during the Second World war.

Lend-lease infused a massive

amount of technology into the Soviet economy.

After the war

the Soviets increased their technology base by dismantling
102
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large segments of German industry as reparation from the
war.
The Soviet Union again turned to the West, when
Khruschev started his "chemicalization" drive in 1958.

The

Soviets needed to upgrade their chemical industry, which was
not advanced enough to produce large amounts of chemical
fertilizers and synthetic plastics.

Much of the technology

brought into the Soviet Union was in the form of complete
turnkey plants or complete sections that were being added to
already existing plants.
In 1973, the Soviets started importing large amounts of
pipeline pipe from the West to supplement their own industrial output.

Other types of technology are imported,

especially in areas where the Soviets are lacking in native
innovations.

The Soviet Union has, so far, been fortunate

to find large deposits of natural gas and oil in easily
accessible areas, but these finds have been less common in
recent years.

As the Soviets are forced to drill deeper,

their equipment becomes less reliable and they have turned
to the West for more advanced technology.
The authors of the chemical studies found that the lead
times for imported plants in the Soviet Union were longer
than those imported by Western countries.

The lead times

were longer when compared to Western countries but they were
shorter than if the Soviets had built the plants themselves.
Since the lead times for imported plants have been shorter

104
than for domestically produced plants, the Soviets have
become reliant on Western imports as domestically produced
plants continue to have a lower priority status.
When the Soviets have used domestic innovation production techniques, they have had trouble between the
research facilities and the produ6tion facilities.

The

production facilities have had to continue to meet their
production output targets while they were forced to retool
for their new products.

This has caused production managers

to be reluctant to innovate because there has been no stimulus to innovate, only a stimulus for reaching set production
targets.
The importation of Western chemical plants allows the
Soviets to produce chemicals in their own country, but
little is learned about how the plant works.

Different

groups in the Soviet Union are responsible for the design,
construction, start-up and modification, and assimilation
phases of a chemical plant.

This has caused a chemical

plant to be obsolete before it was ever completed.

These

problems have caused chemical plants, in the Soviet Union,
to take a longer time to be built and a longer time to reach
full production capacity.

The Soviet Union has continued to

import Western technology to maintain and update chemical
industries instead of undertaking systemic changes.
In the petroleum industry, as well as other industries,
the Soviets have used Western technology for a "fast start"
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program so they do not have to wait on the gearing up of
other domestic industries.

The use of imported technology

allows the Soviet system to be more flexible.

In some cases

the Soviets have started with over optimistic plans, and
their domestic industries cannot produce enough supplies to
meet the demands.

The Soviets have then turned to the West

to supplement domestic production.

The Soviets then started

to rely on Western imports, and domestic output no longer
continued to have high priority status, which then can
inhibit domestic output in favor of Western imports.
The planning system in the Soviet Union is based on
vertical hierarchies which are good at total output production quotas, but have trouble meshing horizontally with
other industries.

The planning system does not promote

incentives for new innovations.

Total output of production

is ranked higher than quality of production, leading to low
quality goods.

This causes domestic goods to be of low

quality and causes the Soviets to import higher quality
goods from the West.
An overhaul of the planning system is unlikely to
occur, and therefore, the Soviets have turned to the West
for assistance.

The Soviets have formed joint ventures with

Western companies to seek new petroleum fields.

These joint

ventures show how much the Soviets believe they need Western
technology.

These joint ventu~es are the first time the

Soviets have agreed to share the profits on ventures that
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have occurred on their territory.

The need to import tech-

nology from the West for the petroleum industry is so great
that the Soviets have allowed these joint ventures, in the
hope of increasing petroleum output, especially oil.
In conclusion, it does not appear that the transfer of
Western technology to the Soviet Union has been used to its
full potential.

The Soviet Union continues to have problems
I

absorbing

an~

diffusing the technology into its economy.

The Soviets appear to still be reliant upon Western technology for the next generation of technology.
The long-term growth and expansion of .Soviet civilian
industries does not appear to be occurring without the
infusion of Western technology.

The Soviets are continuing

to import Western technology and will have to continue if
they wish to continue improving the productivity of labor
and capital.

Technology transfers have caused the Soviets

to be dependent on the West to the extent that the Soviets
are allowing Western companies to share in profits from
ventures that take place on Soviet territory.
The length of time that an industry has had high priority status does not appear to have helped it become more
innovative and able to produce the next generation of technology on its own.

To the contrary, the Soviet chemical

industry continues to depend on Western technology to meet
its needs more than the petroleum industry.

Western tech-

nology is sought by the Soviet chemical industry, in part,
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because domestic innovation capabilities have been lowered
over the years as dependency on Western technology has
grown.

The Soviet Union's dependency on Western imports may

help relieve tension between the two groups.

A reduction of

tension may lead to a greater understanding of each other
and a continuance of trade.
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